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Volume 39, Issue 6

SCALIA COMES TO USD

U.S. Supreme Courl Justice and two other distinguished
jurists judge fina l round of the McLennan Moot Courl Competition
FOR MOOT COURT
COVERAGE,
PLEASE SEE
INSIDE PAGE 8

ALSO INSIDE
THIS ISSUE:

The Gay Marriage Debate
-- page 4
Case notes
-- page 12
!Editorials
--page 14
!Madam Grammar
-- page 15
CORPORATE-OWNED LIFE
INSURANCE, OR
"HOW MUCH ARE YOU WORTH
TO YOUR EMPLOYER?"

By Nicole Rothstein
Staff Writer
Have you ever wanted to know how
much you are worth to your employer? Well, it
may be a lot more than you expect and for all
the wrong reasons. In fact, you may be worth
more to your employer dead than alive.
Jane Sims thought her husband was
a valuable employee to Wal-Mart. She just
didn't know how valuable. He h ad worked in
the receiving department at one of Wal-Mart's
distribution centers for eleven years when
h e died in 1998 of a sudden h eart attack.
Unbeknownst to Jane, after his death Wal-Mart
collected $64,000. Jane herself got nothing.
What she discovered is that Wal-Mart, the
company her husband Douglas worked for
before h e died, had taken out a life insurance
policy in his name.
Wal-Mart isn't the only American
corporation that fattens its bottom line in this
manner. The coverage is called broad-based
insurance, corporate-owned life insurance, or
just COLI. For decades, a corporation or an
individual wanting to buy life insurance on
someone else had to have a significant financial
or emotional stake (known as an "insurable
interest") in the person's survival. Companies

Please see COLI at page 15
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MOOT COURT JUDGES
RESPOND TO STUDENT
QUESTIONS

By Damien Schiff
Editor
As part of the events leading up to the
finals of the McLennan Moot Court Competition,
Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States
Supreme Court, Circuit Judge Michael Hawkins
of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, and Justice Judith Haller of the
California Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
were present to answer University of San Diego
School of Law students' queries at two question
and answer sessions. Both sessions were held
Monday, February 16, at the Kroc Institute for
Peace and Justice.
The morning session consisted of two
dozen or so law students, representing various
school organizations, in a conversation with the
three illustrious judges, moderated by USD Law
Professor (and former Scalia law clerk) Michael
Ramsey.
Not surprisingly, the first question
posed to the jurists concerned the recent
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
decision requiring the state legislature to
sanction same-sex marriages.
Asked how
the issue might become a federal one, Justice

Scalia responded that the question of same-sex
marriages would most likely make it to federal
court as a Full Faith and Credit Clause matter
(see Art. N, § 1). Notwithstanding his professed
conservatism, the justice added, in reference to
the attackers of same-sex marriage, that "it
is a little too late to talk about the sanctity of
marriage" in America; and he cited Ms. Brittany
Spears' one day union as a case in point.
Justice Haller noted that California voters
recently approved a referendum that, at least
facially, would prohibit the state's recognition of
same-sex marriages. In light of some California
municipalities' recent recognition of same-sex
marriages, Justice Haller anticipated court
challenges to those city ordinances based upon
the referendum.
Responding to one student's query as
to which newspapers they were accustomed
to reading, the august jurisconsults gave
widely varying answers. Justice Scalia reads
the Washington Post and Washington Times;
Judge Hawkins the New York Times, the
Arizona Republic and about a dozen on-line

Please see Q & A at page 3
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LRAP
PLEDGE
DRIVE

It's time once again for the VSD School
of Law Public Interest Law Foundation LOAN
REPAYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (LRAP)
pledge drive. LRAP helps USD law grads repay
their law school loans if they choose a career
in public interest law. Any USD grad who
works in a public interest law position that
pays $40,000 or less and who has no more
than $50,000 in law school loans is eligible.
The Pledge drive is the main source of
income for our school's LRAP fund. Th anks
to the support of Dean Rodriguez, faculty,
students, and all those who contributed
past pledge drives have raised over $30,000!
During the week of March 8th - 12th,
PILF students will be visiting you and h ave a
table in the Writs to ask for donations. Any
assistance you can provide would be greatly
appreciated and assist in the provision of
legal services to low-income individuals and
traditionally
under-represented
interests
through LRAP. Your donation is tax deductible!

** A prize will be given to the largest donor
for each day. There will also be a raffle each
day for every donation of $5 or more! **
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Mid-semester is h ere and spring break is fast a pproaching. It has
been a busy semester so far, and so much more to come in the next
weeks and months.

Upcoming in March: The Hon. H. Lee Sarokin will moderate a
distinguish ed panel discussing "Secret Settlements vs. The Public
Interest," on Thursday, March 25 at 7 :00 p .m. in the Peace &
Justice Theatre of the Kroc Institute. Distinguished Professor Carl
A. Auerbach will be honored for h is more than 55 years of academic
service and his 20 years at USD School of Law, at a special reception and program on Friday,
March 26, again at the Institute for Peace & Justice. Saturday, March 27 finds the action still on
campu s but at another venue. Preparations a re currently underway for an evening of fun at "The
Golden Anniversary Casino" (a/ k /a The Degheri Alumni Center). The event is sponsored by the
Law School and the SBA, and will feature fun, gambling, some 50th anniversary m emories, and
much more. A peek into our busy April calendar reveals the visit of Justice John Paul Stevens of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Stevens will deliver the 20th Nathanson Memorial
Lectu re on Wednesday, April 7. The big 50th Anniversary Gala Weekend comes up on April 23-25.
Watch for details on these and other events.
I am sorry to r eport that our community has been touch ed by the d eaths of 2 former faculty and
on e generous and d ed icated benefactor. Distinguished Professor Herb Peterfreund passed away
in January at the age of 90. Professor Peterfreund practiced law in New York City and served as
a captain in the infantry, U.S. Army (1942-46) before m ovin g to academia in 1947 . He tau ght
at New York University Law School for more than thirty years, where h e was Frederick I. and
Grace A. Stokes Professor of Law, and Stokes Professor Emeritus, before coming to USD in 1978.
Professor Peterfreund was a familiar and friendly face around the Law School until his retirement
in 1995. Professor Michael Navin, current law professor and co-director of the Agricultural Law
Center at the Dickinson School of Law at Penn State, died on February 25 . After several years of
private law practice with a major firm in Seattle, Washington, Mike Navin joined th e faculty of the
Willamette University College of Law, from which he later moved on to a 14-year tenure on the USD
Law School faculty, from 1973-1987. In 1997 Professor Navin became the seventh dean of The
Dickinson School of Law and h as served on that faculty continuously s ince then. Although Mike
Navin left USD in 1987, h is ties to our campus remained strong. He and Herb Peterfreund will be
missed and ch erished in our history and memories.
Mr. George Pardee, a long-time friend of th e University and a generou s b enefactor of our law
sch ool, passed away on February 23 at th e age of 87 . The names of George and Katherine Pardee
are proudly attached permanently to our Pardee Legal Research Center. We mourn his passing
just as we celebrate in our thoughts and prayers his productive and philanthropic life.
I wish all of our community a happy and restorative Spring Break.

NOTE TO THE READERS

From the Editor,

Some of the readership will no doubt recognize a few changes with this edition of Motions.
To begin with, the newspaper has acquired a new formatting program that, it is hoped, will greatly
increase the appearance (if not content) of the publication. Secondly, astute perusers will h ave
noticed by now that no issue a ppeared for the month of February. No slight is intended toward
that great month (indeed, not the cruelest, and the only which qccasionally really does last longer
than usual). Rather, th e absence of a February edition is due in large measure to a change in
technology and computer equipment. Thirdly, especially sharp readers will h ave noticed a change
in the p aper 's m asthead, and specifically in the m otto a ppearing at the top of page one. Formerly
that m otto read , "ACTA SEMPER VERUS COMMODUM," which phrase, shocking though it may
seem , is pure mumbo-jumbo. Although each word is a genuine Latin verbum, strung together they
are meaningless (and I challenge any lawyer philologist-classicist to show the contrary). Consequently, after som e d ebate and research, a new motto was chosen, thank s to the apt suggestion of
the Reverend Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J., presently of the University of Scranton. Father Tylenda is
well qualified to proffer a Latin m otto, as the esteem ed translator of Thomas a Kempis's Imitation
of Christ and other Latin works. The new motto, "VERBA VOLANT SCRIPTA MANENT," is especially apropos to a newsp aper. And properly to solemnize the occasion, Motions will give one Initial
Portable DVD-9510 Player to each of the first two persons to translate correctly the new motto into
English, and to send said translation, with proper identification, to the paper's e-mail address.

HOW CAN YOU HELP A CHILD?

Volunteer! San Diego's abused and neglected children need you. There are over 7,500 children in foster
care waiting for help. Become a child advocate today.
Serve as~ Court Appointed Special Prosecutor (CASA).
You'll be glad you did. All training provided. Volunteers research the case, gather information, attend
court hearings, and lend support to the child. The
next information sessions will be March 24 and April
14. Call Voices for Children at (858) 569-2019 or visit
www. voices4children. com.
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Q & A, from page 1

publications; and Justice Haller often peruses
the Union-Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and
the Daily Journal. Justice Scalia also noted
that, generally speaking, the press do a poor
job in reporting -legal news. They are concerned
with informing the readership whether the "good
guy" or the "bad guy" won, and not whether the
court properly applied the law. But the average
Joe is more interested in the press's simplistic
characterization, even though it is a caricature
of the judicial process.
Asked about the importance of an
independent judiciary, Justice Scalia admitted
his preference for life-tenured judg~s, but
stressed ·that, if the people want to elect their
judges, then the candidates must not be
constrained from speaking to the issues. Thus
did the justice rationalize his Court's recent
decision in White v. Minnesota, in which a state
law forbidding judicial candidates' discussion of
their personal opinions regarding issues likely
to come before them was held to violate the First
Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth
/
Amendment.
Justice Scalia was then queried whether
in his opinion foreign law or jurisprudence
has any role to play in interpreting the federal
constitution. Succinctly the justice retorted that
foreign law and legal notions have absolutely no
role to play, and ought not to, unless one adopts
the "evolving meaning'' theory of constitutional
interpretation. But that theory produces an
"empty bottle" permitting constant evolution in
meaning: "We may evolve into Frenchmen, God
help us."
Discussion turned to the American
Association of Law Schools (AALS) and its
controversial position concerning JAG Corps
recruiters. The AALS, as a matter of policy,
forbids its members to allow JAG Corps
recruiters on their campuses, because of the
military's allegedly discriminatory "don't ask
don't tell" policy for homosexuals.
Justice
Scalia's opinion of the AALS? "Intolerantly ·
tolerant."
And recusal? "No comment."
What about legal education at Yale?
"Yale is a lousy law school."
When questioned about their law clerk
hiring practices, all the panelists professed
willingness to hire outside the much-ballyhooed
"Top Ten" law schools. Justice Scalia noted
that he has often hired outside the top tier;
but even if Harvard and Yale are bad schools,
it nonetheless remains the case that the best
minds are attracted to them. And whatever one
might conclude about the legal education that
the elite schools provide, it is not so bad as to
spoil minds that were good before matriculation.
Judge Hawkins chimed in, arguing that "really
good law students are good wherever they are."
As for grades and school reputation, Justice
Haller reassured the attendees that most
academic accolades are helpful in finding the
first post-graduation job, but after that, one is
measured by one's job performance.
The morning could not of course pass
without a question to Justice Scalia on his
avowed textualism. "I do not use intent . ..
I do not care about the intent of the Framers
[as opposed to original understanding] . . . I do
not use legislative history." But stare decisis
requires that some cases, although wrongly
decided, be followed. They are like "water over
the dam." "I do not propose ripping up every
decision," but only th.ose decisions that present
issues incapable of judicial - as opposed to
legislative - resolution, an example of the latter
being the abortion cases. A democratic society
should solve these judicially unresolvable
problems by passing laws, not by deferring to
"a bunch of lawyers." The Bill of Rights is ·but
a narrow exception to the rule of democracy;
the constitution is not meant to be a medium of
change.
And what about RICO, Justice Scalia?
"It's a lousy statute."
Asked about the judicial appointment
process, Judge Hawkins declared flatly, "I
think the process is broken." How has this
happened, Justice Scalia? "The Court has
made itself a political institution . . . With five ·
hands the Court can do anything." Thus the
politicization of the confirmation process is but
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MAKING THE GRADE ,
-

LAW SCHOOL CONSIDERS CHANGES TO ITS GRADING SYSTEM
By Jonathan Meislin
Staff Writer
What's wrong with USD? After all, the national ranking is rising, the campus is beautiful,
the weather is perfect, and the beach is close by. The answer, many claim, is the grade distribution
a consequence of the Court's self-politicization. system. USD uses one of the strictest grading
Justice Scalia, when asked how it can curves in the nation. The median student can
be that Justice Clarence Thomas is considered expect to get a C under the current system, as
more a "Scalian textualist" than Scalia himself, opposed to the B curve used by most other law
responded that the charge simply is false. In schools. The proposed solution, supported and
fact, the greatest difference between the two, represented by the Student Bar Association
argued Scalia, is that "my Brother Clarence (SBA), is to inflate USD's grade distribution
does not believe in stare decisis."
system to be comparable to other schools'
Your opinion, Justice Scalia, on the systems. This change will give USD graduates
Ninth Amendment? "The Ninth Amendment is a much deserved edge in the job market, and
a laugher." Well then, what about the Tenth? will eliminate the awkward moment when USD
"The Tenth Amendment is just a reiteration of students have to explain to their interviewer
the whole framework of the Constitution."
that they are a victim of a strict grading system.
The afternoon question and answer Although there is a lot of student and faculty
session presented a larger audience and similar support for the new system, the specifics have
questions.
But when asked about judicial not yet been worked out.
activism, the jurists provided fresh quips.
With the increasing competition among
Judge Hawkins compared judicial activism to law schools, many students are finding it hard
what H.L. Mencken defined as an alcoholic: an to get a job or an internship despite USD's
alcoholic is someone you don't like who drinks prestigious ranking and amenities.
USD
just as much as you; thus a judicial activist is is ranked the 59th best law school in the
someone whose decisions you don't agree with. nation, the. third best law school in Southern
Justice Haller defended the courts generally, California, and the best law school in San
arguing that day in day out "we Liudges] do our Diego, according to US News & World Report.
job in a routine way ... we do justice."
Beyond the rankings, USD's bar pass rate was
Justice Scalia was pressed on his an astounding eighty-three percent, higher than
textualism. What about Brown v. Board of many of the more highly ranked law schools
Education? How would that case have turned in California, only surpassed by Stanford,
out if presented to a Scalian court? The justice Berkeley and UCLA. For a school with so
responded that the questioner was "waiving much to offer, USD's students still compete in
the bloody red shirt of Brown." At one level, a an uphill battle against other law schools that
textualist can argue that the result would have use the already inflated curving system. This
been the same. But at another, deeper, level is a problem because most employers will not
the textualist can argue that it does not matter, number-crunch to figure out if a student from
because no theory of interpretation can produce USD with a lower GPA is more qualified than
likeable results in every case. Even "a stopped a student from another school who boasts
clock is right twice a day." Without textualism a higher and facially more impressive GPA.
and originalism, the people will be unable to Although some employers now understand
control a life-tenured judiciary gone crazy over USD's strict grade distribution system, m any
the "living constitution malarkey."
do not, especially employers located outside
The panelists were asked to name the of San Diego. Stu~ents from USD who are in
jurist whom they most admired. For both competition with students from schools like
Justice Scalia and Judge Hawkins, it was USC, Davis and Hastings, start with a hurdle to
Robert Jackson: Supreme Court Justice, overcome, despite the fact that USD's ranking
courageous dissenter in the reviled Korematsu is becoming more and more comparable to such
v. United States, Attorney General under schools.
Franklin Roosevelt; a man who attended
Even though grade inflation may seem
neither 'law school nor college but was entirely like the right answer, many complications still
an autodidact. Of hirri said Scalia, "he writes lie ahead. For instance, the new system may
like an angel." For Justice Haller, Chief Justice aid future students entering USD, but it is
Marshall deserved high praise, but so too unclear which members of the current student
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor for having been body will benefit from the curve inflation. This
the first female member of the U.S. Supreme may be a problem for those who are competing
Court.
for jobs with students from lower classes who
When questioned about the Ninth will benefit from the grade inflation. This
Circuit's high reversal rate by the Supremes, is the case fo r the dual-degree and evening
Judge Hawkins affably replied, "I don't know students, who will graduate in four years and
what the Supreme Court would do for fun compete with students from the classes below.
without my court."
Will they be disadvantaged from the grade
Should we care what the Europeans distribution system because they graduated
think about our federal c_onstitution? Said with a class that had the benefit of the inflated
Justice Scalia: "We have a lot of stuff in [the grade distribution system? What about future
Constitution] that is not European, and thank employment opportunities, where students who
God!"
graduated only a year apart from one another
How, Justice Scalia, should an will look different on paper, despite their actual
originalist law student avoid altercation with qu alifications ? These details have not been
differently-minded law professors? Not easy to worked out. One possible solution is to apply
say, he responded, but one can still agree with the grade inflation to all students, or at least
a position held by a person one does not like. to all current students. This option was used
After all, in Texas v. Johnson (the flag burning at Willamette, where all students' grades were
case), Scalia came out for, in his words, a inflated, no matter what class they were in .
"scruffy, sandal-wearing bearded weird-a." But (See: Bell Curve Ball, The National Jurist, page 4,
if not originalism, argued the Justice, by what January 2004.) USC is another school that.has
principle would these non-originalis t professors inflated its grading system. USC's solution does
limit the discretion of unelected judges?
not apply retroactively, but the inflated grading
Lastly, the panelists were asked what system will change in form, so employers will
made them choose law as their profession. For not be so confused.
USC's new system will
Judge Hawkins, the starting point was a city use a 1. 9-4.4 grading scale, as opposed to
council meeting in his home state of Arizona, .its original 65-90 grading scale . (See http:
where a very unfriendly council was persuaded //lawweb.usc.edu/students/handbook/secto go the other way because of a lawyer's oral 6.8.html#a.)
argument. For Justice Haller, it was a personal
The grade distribution system is USD's
challenge in a time when the legal culture was next step to becoming more competitive. The.
hostile to women lawyers. But for Justice details are expected to b e worked out in the next
Scalia, he could thank "Uncle Vince," who few months, and p ossibly applied to students'
convinced a freshly eollege-graduated Nino that grades by next semester. Un til then, students
the lawyer's life was not so bad after all.
can only look forward in anticipation.
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THE GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE:
LAWYERS' PERSPECTIVES

By David Moynihan
Special to Motions

By Nicole Rothstein
Staff Writer

By D. Scott Carlton
Special to Motions

Two opinions by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts have together spawned a
controversy over same-sex marriages that
has brought into ql.J.estion the propriety of
the public policy against persons of the same
sex marrying each another. Although the
legislatures of thirty-eight states have spoken
definitively against the union of persons of the
same sex, the Massachusetts high court, in an
opinion signed by three justices with one other
concurring in the judgment, and over three
dissents, found the Commonwealth's statute
limiting marriage to two persons of the opposite
sex invalid (Goodridge I). Incredibly, the court's
subsequent opinion (concerning the remedy
required of the Massachusetts legisla~ure)
changes without explanation the basis . for
the first ruling. This article examines the
jurisprudence - or lack thereof - displayed
by the court, and in no way is meant to enter
into the debate as to how public policy should
resolve the matter.
Goodridge I
To quote an earlier Chief Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court, who spent more than half of his
96 years as a justice, first in Massachusetts and
then on th e U.S. Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. opined: "Upon this point a page of
history is worth a volume of logic." The present
Chief Justice graces us with these facts :

In the nation's most far reaching decision of
its kind, the Massachusetts . Supreme Judicial
Court, in a 4-3 ruling, cleared the way this
m onth for same-sex couples in the state to
marry, ruling that government attorneys "failed
to identify any constitutionally adequate reason"
to deny them the right. In response to a request
from the Massachusetts Senate for clarification
of the court's decision last November and
for a ruling on its proposed Bill No. 2175,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed that the state constitution requires
the recognition of same-sex marriage not just
civil unions. The Massachusetts Legislature
has been given six months to rewrite the state's
marriage laws for the benefit of same-sex
couples.
According to the court's latest opinion,
the. issue considered in Goodridge v. Department
ofPublic Health was not only whether it is proper
to withhold the tangible and intangible benefits
of unions from same-sex couples, but also
whether it is constitutional to create a separate
class of citizens and withhold from that class
the right to participate in the institution of
civil marriage itself. 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
Calling the issue a matter of constitutional
interpretation, and not mere social policy, the
majority held that marriage, being a basic civil
right, if offered to straight couples, cannot
be denied to gay or lesbian couples without
branding the latter as second-class citizens.
Thus, even civil unions "would have the effect of
maintaining and f9stering a stigma of exclusion
that the Constitution prohibits."
Quite frankly, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court should be applauded for its
common sense opinion-which rightly rejected
the state's plainly discriminatory justifications
for denying same-sex couples the right to
marry. Pointing to the considerable defects of
rationality within the state's arguments, the
court held that "segregating same-sex unions
from opposite sex unions cannot possibly be
held to rationally a dvance or preserve ... the
Commonwealth's
legitimate
interests
in
procreation, child-rearing, and the conservation
of resources."
The State first asserted that it wanted
to provide a favorable setting for procreation. If
procr~ation is indeed the crucial concern, then
what about citizens over childbearing age or
those unable to have children naturally? As
the court noted in its earlier opinion, "even
those who cannot stir from their deathbed may
marry." And what is to be done· about lesbian
couples, who may be able to conceive via
artificial insemination and the like, but who still
cannot marry? Arguably, a couple made. up of
two women, both of whom may be fertile, equals
double the chances of procreating.
The State also argued that it wanted
to ensure the optimal setting for child rearing.
Although the Department of Public Health
defines the optimal setting for child rearing as
a "two parent family with one parent of each
sex," the court aptly pointed out that even
awful, self-centered opposite-sex couples are
not precluded from getting married and having
children. And, with the liberal adoption laws
of Massachusetts, preventing same-sex couples
from marrying makes it no more likely that
children will be raised by two parents of the
opposite sex.
Finally, the State said it wanted to
preserve scarce public and private resources.
The court flatly rejected the assumption
that same-sex couples were more financially
independent, and thus less in need of public
and private subsidies. Furthermore, how can
you rationally include non-needy couples of the
opposite sex, while denying non-needy couples
that happen to be of the same sex?

Redefining the word "marriage" strikes a loud
uncomfortable chord among Americans. The
Defense of Marriage Movement,. with its deeply
religious roots, poses an un-engaging opponent
to those demanding same sex marriages. To
confront those citing dubious biblical references
is like asking your mother why you must do a
chore, and she harshly responds : "Because I am
your mother, and I said so." The simple fact is,
however, that marriage has always been defined
as the union between a man and a woman. It
makes sense to use the word marriage to define
this traditional union, and to use another
term, domestic partnership, to define a union
between two people of the same sex. The two
unions are apples and oranges, both fruits, but
still not the same.
If states are going inequitably to
disburse benefits to these two distinctly
different unions, more than simple semantics
is required to justify the disbursement. The
most rational justification for such a distinction
is the states' desires to promote reproduction
and the cultivation of offspring. Religions
and cultures have · recognized this benefit
for thousands of years. In order to continue
the human race, a man and woman must
engage in sexual relations. When children are
produced, it is beneficial to rear the children
with two parental figures, with a natural and
inherent connection, both participating in the
children's upbringing. The ability for same sex
couples to undertake reproduction, through
sexual intercourse, is naturally impossible, and
unnaturally infrequent (i.e. adoption or artificial
insemination) .
The common, civil rights response to
the traditional husband and wife marriage,
however, is that same sex couples can both
raise and adopt (and in some cases bear)
children. Since same sex couples can perform
some of the important functions associated
with the traditional marriage, civil rights
advocates are demanding equal treatment from
state laws. But to make laws for the exception,
rather than the norm, is contrary to the id ea
of adopting laws for the greater good. Perhaps
some exceptions should be made for domestic
partnerships that actually come closer to
the functions of the traditional family, but
to redefine marriage for the exception fails
to provide a sufficient justification for a state
to accept same sex marriages as the societal
equivalent to traditional marriages. Domestic
partnerships simply do not result in the
preferred "nuclear family."
·
Compounding the argument against the
Defense of Marriage M.ovement, however, is the
very public and very untraditional unions of
"man and woman." The marriages of Michael
Jackson, Britney Spears and Liza Minnelli mock
those who look to the government to preserve
the sanctity of marriage. While these sham
marriages don't speak well for those calling for
the preservation of the traditional "holy union,"
it seems equally irresponsible for the state to
provide incentives or subsidies to domestic
partnerships based on the occasional and
tasteless marriage by a handful of irresponsible
heterosexuals.
Along with banning gay marriages,
states have chosen to prevent marriages
between unions of men and women that
are harmful to society. For example, states
criminalize incestuous relationships and void
incestuous marriages between relatives of
close blood relation. Even though incestuous
relationships are a union between a man and
a woman, bearing children in these particular
circumstances is likely to result in severe
medical problems. Like same sex marriages,
nature provides sufficient justification to deny

The plaintiffs are fourteen
individuals,
from
-five
Massachusetts counties. As of
April 11, 2001, the date they filed
their complaint, the plaintiffs,
Gloria
.. ., sixty years old, and
.
Lmda ... fifty-five years old had
been in a committed relationship
for thirty years; the plaintiffs
Maureen .. . , forty nine years
old, and Ellen ... fifty-two year s
old, had been nine a committed
relationship for twenty years and
iived with their twelve year old
daughter, the plaintiffs Hillary
. .. forty-four years old, and Julie,
forty-three years old, have been
in a committed relationship for
thirteen years and lived with
their five year old daughter;
the plaintiffs Gary .. .. , thirtyfive years old, and Richard ...
thirty-seven years old, had been
in a committed relationship for
thirteen years and lived with
their eight year old daughter and
Richard's mother; the plaintiffs
Heidi, thirty-six years old and
Gina , thirty-six years old, had
been in a committed relationship
for eleven years and lived with
their two sons, aged five tears
old and one year, the plaintiffs
Michael . . . forty-one years and
David ... forty-one years old had
been in a committed relationship
for seven years, and the plaintiffs
David . . . fifty-seven years old,
and Robert, fifty-one years
old had been in a committed
relationship for four years and
had cared for David's mother
in theory homes after a serious
illness until she died.
(

With these facts we anticipate that the decision
will show us the relevance of the plaintiffs'
mature years, or the length of their commitment,
or how people who care for their parents should
be allowed to marry. But wait, there's more!
The plaintiffs include business

Please see Moynihan at page 5
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states that it only appears that the marriage
laws regulated heterosexual intimacy b ecau se
only heterosexuals could marry. Suggesting
executives,
lawyers,
an
this is circular reasoning. She misses the point
investment banker, educators,
that that is precisely why the laws were passed,
therapists and a computer
and h omosexuality was not dealt with at the
engineer. Many are active in
time althou gh it existed. On this first point, the
church, community and sch ool
Chief Justice clearly prefers her reasons to that
groups. They have employed
such legal means as are available
of the Commonwealth, and therefore declares
the Commonwealth's reasons "irrational."
to them - for example, joint
Regarding the . second rationale, the
adoption, powers of attorney,
Chief Justice merely states that "(r)estricting
and joint ownership of real
marriage to opposite sex couples cannot
property - to secure aspects
plausibly further the policy of protecting the
of their relation s hips. Each
welfare of children." The opinion does not touch
plaintiff attests a desire to marry
on the word "optimal," which was the basis
his or her partner in order to
for the Commonwealth's position.
Instead,
affirm publicly their commitment
the
Chief
Jµstice
prefers
h
er
conclusion,
so
to each other and to secure the
the Commonwealth's conclusion must b e
legal protections and ben efits
"irrational." Here the Chief Justice su ggests
afforded to married couples and
that because same sex couples may have
their children
dependents, including aging parents in their
Perhaps the court is going to fashion a marriage care, they are no less deserving of the economic
law based on the white-collar status of the benefits of marriage, although she does not
marriage candidates. We can't decipher-at mention why single persons with dependents
least not yet in the Chief Justice's opinion, why should n ot reap the legal financial benefits of
any of this history is relevant, except for one fact. marriage.
They all have been in a "committed relationship"
Two J u stices joined in the Chief Justice's
for many years. WHERE WERE THEY BEFORE opinion. A third concurred in the result,
APRIL 11, 2 001? Could it possibly be that after finding, all alone, that the Commonwealth's
Justice
George W. Bus h's inauguration in January statute violated equal protection.
of 2001 it became clear that the "marriage Greany stated "[t)hat the classification is sex
penalty" was to be eliminated? It is remarkable based is self evident." He does not state which
that after all these years these couples were sex, male or female, is discriminated against,
able to find their co-plaintiffs finally to "affirm and instead invents a new gender: "same sex."
publicly" their commitment to th eir respective Obviously this cannot be discrimination against
an individual, and it is clear why the other three
partners.
Back to the constitutionality of the justice who found th e law unconstitutional
Massachusetts statute. The law in question, avoided any "suspect' class analysis.
Three justices dissented. All three joined
G.L. c.207, on which the Chief Justice focuses,
licenses the legal union of a man and woman in the opinions of one another. Justice Spina,
as husband and wife, "and the plaintiffs do not warning of the far reaching repercussions of the
argue that the term 'marriage' has ever had a majority's activism, wrote:
different meaning under Massachusetts law...
court has previously
This
. This definition of marriage ... derives from the
exercised the judicial restraint
common law. . . . Far from being ambiguous,
mandated by art. 30 and declined
to extend due process protection
the undefined word 'marriage' as u sed in G.L.
to rights
not traditionally
c.207 confirms the [Massach usetts House's)
coveted, despite recognition of
intent to h ew to the common law and quotidian
their social importance.
meaning
concerning
the gender s of the
marriage partners." Following a tour de force of
Likewise, the Supreme Court
the futility of abandonin g distinctions su ch as
"illegitimacy" and a comparison to laws against
exercises
restraint
in
the
application of substantive due
interracial marriage, the court gets down to the
process because guideposts for
constitutional business at hand.
responsible decision-making in
this uncharted area are scarce
The department argues that no
fundamental right or "suspect"
and open-ended. By extending
constitutional protection to an
class is at issue here, and rational
asserted right or liberty interest
basis is the appropriate standard
of review. ... [W)e conclude that
we, to a great extent, place the
the marriage ban does not meet
matter outside the area of public
debate and legislative action.
the rational basis test for either
We must therefore
'exercise
due process or equal protection.
the u tmost care whenever we
Because the s tatute does not
are asked to break new ground
meet the rational bas is review,
in this field,' lest the liberty
we d o not consider the plaintiffs '
arguments that this case m eets
protected by the Due Process
strict judicial scrutiny.
Clause be subtly transformed
into the policy preference of the
The department posits three
Members of this Court. [internal
legislative
rationales
for
quotation marks omitted] [Mr.
Justice Spina cited to various
prohibiting same-sex couples
cases of the Massachusetts and
from marrying:
(1) providing
United States Supreme Courts].
a
"favorable
setting
for
procreation". (2) en suring the
Justice Sossman, also dissenting from
optimal setting for child rearing,
the Chief Justice's opinion, pointed out:
which the department defines
as "a two parent family with
It is not, however, our
one parent of each sex"; and
assessm ent
that
matters.
(3 ) preserving scarce State and
Conspicuously absent from the
financial resources. We con sider
court's opinion today is any
each in turn.
acknowledgment that attempts
at scientific study of the
The lower court held that the "state's
raffi:ifications of raising children
interest in regulating marriage is based
in same-sex couples households
on the traditional con cept
that marriage's
are themselves in their infancy
primary purpose is procreational." The Chief
and so far have produced
J u s tice's answer: "Th is is incorrect." Not
inconclusive · and
conflicting
"this is irrational," but "you, Massachusetts,
results.
Notwithstanding our
are wrong about what your primary purpose
belief that gender and sexual
is ." Interesting. It is incorrect , the Chief
orienta tion of parents should not
J u stice says, beca u se the law does not privilege
m atter to the success of the child
procreation above all other forms of intimacy.
rearing venture, studies to date
As a basis for her conclusion the Chief Justice
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reveal that there are still some
observable differences between
children raised by opposite sex
couples and children raised
by same-sex couples. . . . The
legislature is not required to
share that belief but may, as the
creator of the institution of civil
marriage, wish to see the proof
before making a fundamental
alteration to that institution.
Shorn of
emotion-laden
invocations, the opinion ultimately
opines that the Legislature
is acting irrationally when it
grants benefits to a
proven
successful family structure while
denying the same benefits to a
recent, perhaps promising, but
essentially untested alternate
family structure.
J u stice Cordy, also dissenting, stated
that courts that have found the right to marry to
be fundamental have focused on the underlying
interest of every individual to procreation.
The legislature's allowing same-sex couples to
adopt, argued Justice Cordy, is premised on the
inability or µnwillingness of one of the biological
parents to do so.
The Chief Justice's opinion and the
concurrence by Justice Greany were enou gh
to carry the day. But the remedy ordered was
not to require the variou s departments to issue
marriage licenses, nor was it to strike down
the marriage statute in toto. Instead, the court
ordered the legislature to do an undetermined
something within the next 180 days.
Goodridge II
In response to Goodridge I, the
Massachusetts Senate considered a bill that
would make available to same sex couples all of
the protections, benefits, rights, responsibilities
and legal incidents that are now available
to opposite sex married couples, but would
denominate the relationship thus created a
"civil union" instead of a "civil marriage." The
Senate su bmitted th e question to the Supreme
Judicial Court whether such a designation
would comply with the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth and various articles of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The same
majority signed a new opinion by the Chief
Justice that answered a resounding "NO;"
In rejecting the Senate's proposal to
confirm to same-sex couples all the rights and
responsibilities of marriage but not the title
"marriage," the Chief J u stice argued:
(I)ntangible ben efits fl.ow from
marriage . . . intangibles that
are an important component
of marriage as a "civil right".
[We) stated that "[m]arriage also
bestows enormous private and
social advantages on those who
choosetomarry ... [and) isatonce
a deeply personal commitment
to another human being and
a highly public celebration
of
the ideals of mutuality,
companionship,
intimacy,
fidelity and family." Because it
fulfills yearnings for security,
safe haven, and connection that
express our common humanity,
civil marriage is an esteemed
institution, and the decision
whether and whom to marry is
among life's momentous acts
of self-d efinition.
Therefore,
without the right to choose to
marry, same-sex couples are not
only denied full protection of the
laws, but are "excluded from the
full range of human experience.
Not only is there no explanation as to how the
compromise legislation would deny anyone
the "full protection of the law," but this is the
language of fundamental rights and suspect

Please see Moynihan at page 6
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that rights can be fundamental even if they
were traditionally considered immoral or even
classes that the court so carefully eschewed criminal, as long as they have become "implicit
in Goodridge I. In dissent Justice Sossman in the concept of ordered liberty."
wrote:
Whether States may use their regulatory
authority to bar same-sex couples from civil
Today's answer to the Senate's
marriage was a question the United States
question discards the fig leaf
Supreme Court left open as a matter of federal
of the rational basis test and,
law in Lawrence, where it was not an issue.
relying on the rhetoric rather
The Massachusetts court picked up this issue
than the purported reasoning
and cited Lawrence f~>r the proposition that the
of Goodridge [I], assumes that
court's obligation "is to define the liberty of all,
discrimination on the basis of
not to mandate our own moral code." According
sexual orientation is prohibited
to the court, barring same-sex couples access
by our Constitution as if sexual
to civil marriage arbitrarily deprives them of
orientation were indeed a suspect
membership in one of the community's most
classification. If that is the view
rewarding and cherished institutions, an
of the majority of the justices,
exclusion incompatible with the constitutional
they should identify the new test
principles of respect for individual autonomy
they have apparently adopted for
and equality under law. Citing the fact that
determining that a classification
same-sex couples are elsewhere afforded
ranks as "suspect" - other types
equal treatment under Massachusetts law,
of persons making claims of a
especially in the realm of parental rights, the
denial of equal protection will
court stated that the ban "works a d eep and
need to know whether they,
scarring hardship on a very real segment of the
too, can qualify as a "suspect"
community for no rational reason."
classification under that new
Critics of the most recent decision by
test and therefore obtain strict
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
scrutiny analysis of any statute,
argue that proposed Senate Bill 2175, drafted
regulation or program that uses
in response to the high court's ruling last
that classification.
November, accords same-sex couples all of
the substantive benefits, rights and privileges
Nevertheless, the resounding "No" of as opposite-sex couples within a parallel civil
the majority has forced a constitutional crisis union framework. As Justice Sosman points out
and a constitutional convention. A compromise in h er descent, why is it that a different mµne, a
amendment similar to the Senate bill was mere difference in form, automatically connotes
rejected last week by liberal and conservative a lesser status in violation of the Constitution?
elements of the Massachusetts legislature, each Exactly what is in a name?
taking an "all or nothing approach." The battle
As the Massachusetts court points out,
is set to produce an amendment prohibiting the difference between the terms "civil marriage"
same-sex "marriages." Political pundits are and "civil union" is far from harmless-"it is a
predicting the amendment's passage in the considered choice of language . that reflects a
Massachusetts legislature and, by a narrower demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely
margin, the people of the Commonwealth. homosexual."
The denomination of the
Presumably the Goodrich I and II majority will difference as merely a "squabble over the
be able to hear the legislature and the people name to be used" clearly misses the point that
when the constitutional prohibition against separate but equal hardly ever is. Maintaining
same-sex marriages is answered by a "YES." two separate classes of unions, according
At least the four justices cannot prohibit the to the court, has the effect of "maintaining
process.
and fostering a stigma ·that the Constitution
In the meantime, the City of. San prohibits ." The word "marriage" itself then is
Francisco is issuing marriage licenses to same- one of its protections.
sex persons in violatioµ of California law.
Marriage is
unique relations hip-Why these couples could not wait the average synonymous with "family." While same-sex
fourteen years the Massachusetts plaintiffs couples can protect themselves in limited
waited to assert their commitment is unclear, ways by creating wills, health care proxies
but then again April 15th is coming up, and and co-parent adoptions, these arrangements
those deductions are looking awfully good.
do not come close to emulating the automatic
***
protections and peace of mind that marriage
[The cases are Goodridge v. Dep't of Public confers. Further, it is a gateway to hundreds of
Health, SJC 08860 (Mass. Nov. 18, 2003); and legal protections established by the state and
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, SJC over one thousand by the federal government.
09163 (Mass. Feb. 3, 2004)) .
Far from undermining marriage, the
***
struggle for full equality for same-sex couples
(David S. Moynihan is a graduate of the College is an acknowledgement of the important role
of the Holy Cross (as is Mr. Justice Greany) and marriage has in society and the power it has
the New England School of Law. He received an over all our lives. Same-sex couples, in seeking
LL.M in International Law from the University the freedom to marry, have simply asked that
of San Diego in 1998, and an LL.M. in Taxation their relationships be given the same respect
from the same school in 2002. He is licensed to under law accorded to others.
practice law in California, Massachusetts and
With the ruling, the Massachusetts
before the United States Supreme Court).
legislature is now set to consider an amendment
legally defining marriage as between a man and
a woman. The ruling has also revived interest
Rothstein,
in a proposed federal constitutional amendment
continued from page 4
that would define marriage throughout the
The
Massachusetts decision
also country as "the union of a man and a woman,"
seems to rest squarely within the reasoning which has been pending in Congress since May
of Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 2003. Although both President Bush and U.S.
(2003). In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Sen. John Kerry, a Massachusetts Democrat,
Court struck down a statute criminalizing same- oppose gay marriage, the proposed amendment
sex sodomy, affirming that the "core concept could well become an issue in the 2004
of common human dignity, protected by the presidential election.
In the meantime, one of the biggest
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
precludes government intrusion into the questions arising from this decision is
deeply p ersonal realms of consensual adult whether other states will have to recognize
The
expressions of intimacy and one's choice of an Massachusetts's same-sex marriages.
intimate partner." In reaffirming the central answer is presently unclear. Article IV of the
role that decisions su ch as whether to marry federal constitution requires that each state
or have children play in shaping one's identity, grant "full faith and credit" to "the public acts,
Lawrence suggests that statutes banning records, and judicial proceedings" of its sister
same-sex marriage may be unconstitutional. states. However, a judge-made exception to
The court also plainly rejects the principle the full-faith-and-credit requirement currently
that fundamental rights are dependant upon permits states to deny recognition to out-ofa finding of "deeply rooted tradition," stating state marriages on public policy grounds.
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States whose public policy condemns samesex marriage might b e able to invoke this
exception to deny recognition to Massachusetts·
marriages.
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
passed in 1996, specifically authorizes states to
deny recognition to same-sex marriages of sister
states. But the statute may not be constitutional.
The federal constitution empowers Congress to
prescribe the "manner" in which states accord
full faith and credit; yet, some say that it does
not appear to give Congress the authority to
regulate the substance of full faith and credit.
If the legal briefs filed in the Massachusetts
case are any indication, it is likely that the
DOMA could be challenged on Full Faith and
Credit grounds (or Equal Protection Clause
grounds) now that same:.sex marriage is legal in
Massachusetts.

Carlton, continued from page 4
marital benefits to those that cannot, and those
that should not, bear children. Yet same sex
marriages do not substantively impact society
as might incestuous child-bearing relationships.
In terms of harmful effects, gay marriages do
little but offend religious zealots. Hence, states
banning same sex marriages may not do so on
the basis that such relationships may result in
potential harm to the innocent.
In addition, the refusal of states to
grant legal benefits to incestuous marriages
is not formed on moral grounds. Incest laws
generally prevent relationships between those
of close blood relationship; they do not prevent
relationships between close family members (i.e.
step-brother & step-sister) . A man can marry
a woman with a ten year-old daughter, and
eight years later divorce his wife and marry his
eighteen year-old step-daughter. But states take
no action to prevent this morally questionable
relationship. Therefore, states banning same
sex marriages cannot base their rationale
on moral grounds. If society is prepared to
recognize the marriage of a step-father and stepdaughter and but not to recognize the marriage
of two consenting adults of the same sex, then
marriage is a baffling moral hypocrisy. The only
rational way to justify the failure of states to
recognize same sex marriages while recognize
step-father - step-daughter marriages, is to
address the fact that the former relationship
has the natural potential of developing into a
child-bearing family.
Since the state's interest in s ubsidizing
marriage through incentives relates more to
developing the natural and traditional family,
those incentives should be conferred only to
those couples that have a reasonable potential
of forming such families . Current marriage
laws, however, extend marital benefits to
s"e veral categories of heterosexual relationships
unrelated to the intended goals of the
incentives. In fact, these relationships, enjoyed
by h eterosexual couples, are also commonly
found in domestic partnerships. However, states
fail to define these traditional marriages as
domestic partnerships, or at least fail to prevent
subsidizing marriages that possess no rational
relation to the state subsidizing the couple.
So why should states continue to subsidize
marriages that, like same sex marriages, are
highly ·u nlikely to need incentives associated
with the nuclear family?
Prior to the formation of any marriage
between man and wife, it would be difficult
appropriately to identify which particular
young h eterosexual couples will have children
and which will not (due to infertility, elective
surgery, medications, and choice) . Thus, it
would be impossible to identify which couples
would b e eligible for marital rather than
domestic partnership benefits. Further, it is
not irrational to presume that a high percentage
of young heterosexual marriages develop into
the nuclear family. True, a high percentage of
heterosexual couples eventually develop into
the traditional nuclear family. But when should
marriage benefits start? At the beginning of
those unions? The refusal of states to designate
young, childless heterosexual married couples
as domestic partners (or at least bestow or deny
the same rights) suggests an underlying form
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From the Editor: Continuing our look back into the law school's past during itsfifti.eth
anniversary year, MOTIONS reprints this issue the front page ofThe Woolsack's November 1969 edition, featuring the inimitable Melvin Belli, "King of Torts."

Or

v
King of Torts

Grant Cooper

- 8 . ENGLEBRECHT

Cooper Reveals Pressures In·
Defending.Unpopular Clients
Grant Cooper, Sirhan Sirhan's defense attorney, spoke in More
Hall Oct. 24, at the invitation of Phi Alpha Delta. Mr. Cooper's
topic was, "Criminal L<lwyer - Saint or Sinner."
Mr. Cooper opened by
·
.
questioning the basic concept ~ence ~us! be dec1d~.d by an
of our legal system - that a imp~rt1al .Jury upon careful
man is presumed innocent consideration of all the facts,
until proven guilty. He said not by the press, the police, the
that with the upsurge of in- Dist~ict Att?rney, or the
terest in criminal law due to pubhc. He also advised that
the mass media, a defendant is there is a very real possibility
often found guilty in·the eyes of that the opportunity of a fair
the general public before the trial goes by the board if these
case even comes to trial. This forces are not kept at bay.
Mr. Cooper went on to
is especially true with a
notorious defendant, such as describe
th e
problems
Jack Ruby, Sirhan, Richard associated with being in the
Speck, etc.
position of defending an unMr. Cooper countered that popular defend~nt. He said
the question of guilt or inno- that when it was announced
that he would defend Sirhan,.
"The reaction of the public was
almost universally one of
shock and indignation."
He read a few letters from
people attacking him for
taking the case (See photo
Effectiv~ September 1970,
above). The letters were ex- :
tuition at the law school will be tremely abusive, their writers
increased. The announcement calling him everything from a
came from Dean Sinclitico at a communist to a fascist, as well
meeting of the SBA, Nov. 11. as several unprintable names,
The Day Division rate will be simply because he had the
increased from $600 to $750 per courage to practice the precept
semester.
Night school of equal justice for all.
The major problems of the
students will pay $500, compared · to the present $450 a defense attorney, he thought,
semester. The single unit rate are that the public feels that
the attitudes of the defendant
will be raised to·$60.
The Dean said the increase are the attitudes of his at- ·
was not simply a matter of torney, that there is a tendency
P.rofit and revealed that the to allow personal feelings to
school has operated with affect the willingness to fight
deficit for the past several for a client, and that the
years. He went on to mention· financial problems of trying to
sever<U improvements planned defend indigent clients are
for next yearrnention several! immense unless there is some
iqiprovements plannlild for. outside support to keep the
next year, including the hiring!· attorney going.
Concluding, Mr . Cooper
of
several · additional1
stated that the defense atprofessors.
The Dean said he was en-, torney has a duty to defend his
couraged by the calibre of client, regardless of his perstudents enrolling the pas~ sonal feelings.
years and said he felt the·
school was on its way to
becoming an outstanding law.
school. "But,,' he concluded,'
"we have a way to go yet, and
we need money
Half forgotten in the heated
.. to do it."
discussion
during
and
following the Student-Faculty
Co-operation Committee
meeting Nov. 13 were three
interesting topics.
Approved wasthe proposal
· ! ·that grades be posted on the
U.S. District Judge Fred
bulletin board as soon as all
Kunzel, 68,. a 10-year
grades for a separate section
veteran of the federal
or class are in. The policy has
court bench, died of an
been to withhold all such inap pare nt heart attack
formation until grades were
Nov. 19 at his Point Loma
mailed to the student after
home.
every professor in the school
Judge Kunzel was chief
bad turned in his grades.
U.S. district judge for
The subject of mandatory
the southern district of
attendance at classes is to be
California, including San
studied further to determine
Diego and Imperial coun·
precise state requiremen~ as
ties. He was appointed to
well as those of the Veterans
the federal bench in 1959
Administration covering
by President Eisenhower.
students who qualify for VA
benefits.

Tuitior:i Up
Next Year

Early Posting
of Grades OK'd

Judge Kunzel
Dies at 68

Capacity Crowd Hears Belli

He was introduced as the King of Torts but
he was more like the pied piper as he led his
spellbound audience from place to place,
sharing with them experience after
fascinating experience along the way.
The speaker was Melvin M. Belli, a lawyer
who lives the law. The kind who goes to
Stockholm to get a different view of pornography and probes into a cadaver to get a
real feel fo.r human physiology.
At the invitation of P.A.D. law fraternity,
Mr. Belli came to San Diego Nov. 7 to speak in
More Hall. And speak he did. He covered
everything from topless dancers to capital
punishment. His main theme, however, was
the modern-day law. He spoke of a "present
day revolution in the law'' which is ushering in
a "golden age" of the law, a law that "fits into
daily living."
High on his list for praise was the Supreme
Court, for its part in bringing changes about.
"The Brown case alone was enough to
'jµstify the existence of the Warren Court," he
said. "Whether you're from the South or the
North or wherever. If you don't like it or you
do like it, you've got to recognize the social
and historical fact that if we didn't get integration when we did, we'd have had the
damnedest revolution in this coqntry that they
ever had."
Belli went on to talk about Gideon v.
Wainwright and Escobedo v. Illinois.
"What runs through these Supreme Court

the coroner's inquist onto the same garbage
heap, saying it worked well in the days of
Henry VIII but that most of the states had
progressed beyond that period.
Mr. Belli spoke of corpus juris - the "whole
body of the law," and said "if you have
something festering in one spot its going to
affect the entire corpus.'' What he was getting
at was the topless controversy. "The same
law that applies to obscenity and pornography
cases is the law that applies to your right to go
to church and the right to hold property," he
maintained.
" If you have arbitrary law in obscenity or
topless, you set the stage for some arbitrary
law in· the right of minority religions to
worship," he continued.
Mr. Belli said that in his defense of a recent
topless case he had come head to head with

cases is the protection of the individual," he
said. "That's the gravamen of the law revolt
in the United States Supreme Court, and
you're not getting it in the legislature. Jn the
legislature its en masse. In the United States
Supreme Court they don't work on causes,
they work on individuals.
"The layman says the Supreme Court
wastes too much time on the drunks, the
Gideons and people like that,'' he went on. "I
say, as long as the Supreme Court wastes its
time, if you will, on the least of us, then the
majority of us are protected."
All is not yet perfect, however. Belli called
the Grand Jury system outmoded, observing
that when a man is indicted and later
acquitted, people tend to refer to him as the
man who was indicted. Mr. Belli would toss

the California Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board. "The ABC has a plenary grant of
power. In everything to do with liquor they
shall determine if its good for the health and
welfare of the people," he said, adding that
within this power the commissioner can arbitrarily determine what go~s on, in there,
including what color wallpaper, what kind of
lights, what type of entertainment and the
like.
"That amounts to censorship," he warned, ·
saying the same rule of law that applies to
freedom of speech applies to topless.
An hour after it had begun the world-wind
tour ended, leaving many a law student with
stars in his eyes. The more practical vQiced a.
different view: Can you imagine having to
face that man in court?
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In the next few weeks students wiliface a special
" SBA election to vote on proposed changes to the
SBA By-laws. On page 2, these proposed changes

printed, as well as an editorial li.'tating the
,0 .Wo-Oisack's position in the matter. Also on that
page, SBA President, Sam Alhadeff
gives his
1
views on the subject.

wta,~

Also inside ... on page 5 we are printing the first
semester exam schedule, along with a special
feature aimed at the beginning law student facing
.h is Jim exams.
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THE 2004
MCLENNON MOOT COURT
COMPETITION:
FINAL ROUND

THE CASE
ACLA v. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/
Willamette, Inc.

The case presented three issues: ·
Whether two anti-abortion posters-produced by Petitioner constitute a true threat or
I:Jrotected First Amendment speech;
2.
Whether the materials posted on the
Petitioner's website constitute a true threat or
protected First Amendment speech;
3.
Whether de nova review is the correct
appellate standard.
1.

JUSTICE SCALIA:
"It was a close question and the
court wa~ divided, but someone has
to win and someone has to lose. It's
not much different from what you
would see in an appellate court.
The questioning is just as annoying - it's the judges' opportunity
to
probe for weakness. I think they
Photo by Pablo Mason
Pictured from left to right: Judge Michael Hawkins of the United States Court of did a very good job, and I congratuAppeals for the Ninth Circuit; Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme late both counsel and the team that
Court; and Justice Judith Haller of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District. picked the case."
(George Decker, "Scalia puts USD law students
to the supreme test," San Diego Daily Transcript, Feb. 18, 2004, at 3A).

"I remember well over a year now
Dean Rodriguez indicating to me
that the USD law students deserve
a prestigious internal moot court
competition. The Dean explained in_
detail his vision of this competition
and has continually provided hi~
time, energy, wisdom, and financial
support so that his idea could become
a reality. Having now finished the
third year of this very successful
competition, I am confident in saying
that the tradition Dean Rodriguez
has started will not end. This is
especially true given the dedication
and hard work ofthe USD Moot Court
Board. On behalf ofthe faculty, I also
wish to congratulate each and every
one of the advocates. Let me sum up
with a few words that come to mind
regarding the students that competed
in
the McLennan
competition:
intelligent, confident, poised, and
Photo by Pablo Mason most definitely fearless.
You are
"What an amazing honor-to argue an amazing group of lawyers and I
before a justice of the Supreme Court am proud and honored to have been
and other distinguished judges. This your teacher."
is the opportunity of a lifetime."
---Professor Michael Devitt
Finalis t and Winner of the 2004 Moot
Court Competition, J essica Heldman
I

Photo by Pablo Mason

''Arguing in the final round before
SU.ch a distinguished panel ofjurists,
including Justice Scalia, was an
unparalleled thrill and a delight."
Finalist and Runner-Up of the 2004 Moot
Court Competition, Maura Hartmere

~
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Join the WOMEN'S LAW CAUCUS
Tuesday, March-23d at 4PM in the Writs
for the

ANNUAL FACULTY AUCTION
Cham.pagne, Beer, Hors D'Oeuvres & Door Prizes
Proceeds to Benefit Becky's House and
The Loan Repaym.ent Assistance P~ograDl
1
Faculty donations in the past have included:
* Dinner with Dean Rodriguez for 10 * Wine tasting for 8 with Professor Allen Snyder
* Happy Hour with Jocelyn, Pat and Verna from the Records Office
* Tailgating & Padres Game with Lawyering Skills Faculty
* Round of Golf with Professors Minan & Cole
I*
Dinner & Drinks with Professors Devitt & Claus
I*
$500 off BarBri
I*
& Many More!

U~D

-.l

LAW STUDENTS, FACULTY AND STAFF:

WIN PRIZES!
THE LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER WANTS TO
HEAR FROM YOU!
When you participate in the LRC's user survey
LibQUAL+
you are entered to win a prize!
Navigate to http:/ /survey.libqual.org/index.cfm?ID=753633

GRAND PRIZE: PDA
OTHER PRIZES:
FIVE $50 CASH PRIZES
(one entry per person)

To en sure the confidentiality of your comments, surveys go directly to LibQual+ and will be aggregated without n ames for
the LRC. E-mail addresses are sep arately registered for random electronic selection of prize winners.
The LRC will notifv winners in Aoril.

./
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WHY HAS OUR CULTURE
BECOME SO COARSENED?

By Frank Morriss
replaced by an extreme libertarianism that
Special to Motion s
pu ts the individual not merely beyond, but
Anyone whose mem ory goes back four alon e and outside all others. The isolated man
or five decades knows over the past ten years acts withou t a sen se of social duty, without
or so there h as been a coarsening of America, sen s itivity t o other s' feelings, with no regard for
a descent into .Public vulgarity, indecen cy, and others' r eaction. Indeed, shock b rought on by
a demeaning of h uman dignity, as if culture su ch insen s itivity gives to the isolated man a
itself were the waiting room of a brothel. Our sen se of superiority to others. It has b ecome a
children u se words su itable for a saloon in a sign of being "cool" to speak and act with regard
red-ligh t district . Even respectable figures find only for self.
language acceptable that once marked th e user
Partly responsible for this isolationism
as common . Com edians present t o gen eral is the acad em ic acceptance of Darwinism as
h ome a u diences toilet humor and worse. Girls an explanation for the appearance of man on
earth, an offshoot or "sport"
from norm al families
in the evolution of brutes from
dress as if th ey were
amoebae, and from brutes to
auditioning to be
streetwalkers.
"r ational animals." There was
i no place in this "descent of
None
of
this can be denied,
man" for his being "a little less
though some find it
than an angel," since modern
man d oes not believe in angels,
apparently progress
th at is modern "educated"
toward
liberation ,
man. With the discard of
whereas it is like the
angels,
m an
inevitably
stagnant pond that
became just a little more than
the poet crossed led
a brute. It was inevitab le that
by his Muse to visit
Darwin's Man would b ecome
Hell, and seeing a
man filled with mud rise before the b oat , ask ed , the d isgusting Yahoo of Guliver's Travels.
"Who are you who h ave become so foul?" (Ma
_With acceptance of men as m erely "n aked
tu chi se?, che sei si fatto brutto? La Divina a pes," h istory became of little importance. And
with contem pt for history, m an must be simply
Commedia, transla ted by Louis Biancolli) .
All this s h ould be con sidered as to its isolated in the present. Since with evolution the
causes and its con sequences, before it is too past was less perfect than the present, then
late. The coarsening of cultu re has p receded the nothing of the past could be a model or lesson
fall of empires more than once in history. When for th e p resent. That is why the study of history
animal instincts of man ch allenge h is intellect has been set aside. It now has nothing to say to
and spiritual qualities, his appetite can replace those who come after it. The idea of the past as
the qualities of selflessness necessary for the prologue is incomprehensible to those of today's
dedication that sacrifices self for the common generation , told as they are that past times were
good . Victory at arms n eeds a certain purity of an example of the need to escape to a future
heart as much as it need s s kill. Disciplin e fails utopia. ,.
A scien tific world needs no culture; it
wh en indulgence replaces it. The vocation to
put oth ers ahead of self serves n ation s as well n eeds only tech n ique, and the application of
as God, and at th e h eart of America's descent indu ction, rather than deduction. It "feels"
toward "th e sands of h orror" (orribil sabbione) its way to achievement. It ignores that th e.
is a sort of isolation of the individual in the few import ance of m an walking on the moon or
years given us humans to live.
Mars is only in that it is being done by ManHow has this isolation taken place? that is, what is doing the walking, not on the
For one, by the pu tting aside of thou ght what of the m oon or Mars. We could drop off
and replacing it with feeling, that is, with a whole men agerie of brutes on the farthest
"experience." It is considered today that we planet there is from earth , and it would be
know best, or even only, by experience. That is of absolutely no importance at all other than
the essence of existentialism. Bu t that ignores what Man migh t learn about himself from the
that such is possible only for the individual, d oing of it. Scientific accomplishment is n eu tral
who cannot feel or experience wh at any other regarding culture or human dignity.
of h is fellow humans do. To do that requires
Another cause of the coarsening of
knowledge of that which on e shares with all m odern culture is the feminist movement that
other humans, "human nature." Pascal said has insisted that having equal rights m eans
this better when he wrote (Pensees) of "the accepting women's doing everything men
extraordinary blindness" th at is living "withou t are allowed to do. The insistence was that t o
investigating what we are." He commented have equ al rights women should be accepted
long ago on what is today th e human situation: as no different from men. Thus acceptance of
"True ·nature being lost, everything becomes a certain coarseness thought to accompany
its own nature; as the true good being lost, maleness, whether with any basis or not,
everything b ecomes its own true good."
became acceptance of the same regarding
In this stat e of things the individual women. When women became troopers, it was
sees whatever he chooses to do or say as his inevitable they would soon be swearing like
"right" and therefore good , without reference troopers. If m en have historically been tolerated
to its effect on others. He does it "his way," in acting out lust, it became certain that women
and is con sidered a hero in doing so, even if in would be more inclined to offer themselves for
the doing it h e does and communicates more such practice. And male reaction to sexual
in the m ann er of a brute, than a man. Again desire would soon be considered to be identical
Pascal: "Man does not know in what rank to to that of women. Nak edness, undress on the
place himself. He has plainly gone astray, and part of women, was carried to an extreme far
fallen fro m his true place." The consequences beyond prudent modesty with the excu se that
of abandoning ontology and the knowledge of men and women were the same in matters of
Christian faith served by the science of being sex, when it is qu'ite obvious they are not.
h as now caught up with post-Reformation
Flirtation, long con sidered proper
culture . The individual is isolated in self anEl. by women in courts hip , degenerated first
consequ ently acts, speaks and "experiences" to titillation and then to sexual enticement.
without regard for consequences brought upon Signs that once said to a man the woman was
others, with disdain for any "common good."
available for marriage have come to mean "no
Respect for any ethics that stressed need to wait for marriage," though the woman
duty as the con comitant of "right" h as nearly might have no intention the sign be taken
disappeared. The conservatism that follows seriously- a d angerou s naivete.
from scholastic · ontology's insistence on
All of this has dem eaned con siderably
the importance of human nature has been the gen u in e purpose of sex, for procreation in

A scientt}1c wor
needs no culture;
needs only technique,
and the application o
induction, rather tha
deduction. It ''feels" it
way to achievement.

·-

the environment of marriage necessary to create
the stable family. Today sex is publicly flaunted
as a toy, nothing p rivate or precious. It is the
matter of low comedy, to be laughed at and
put on a plane with bodily functions that serve
m an's animality, whereas sex is meant to serve
h is capacity to love, rather than to lust. Women
are encouraged t o think of themselves as the
object of that lust, rather than of love. Dante
wrote about that, too, in his Inferno, when
describing the fate in Hell of Th ais, a prostitute
who u sed her beau ty to bring abou t the burning
of n a tion s' greatness . It is a lesson ab out the
d estructiven ess of lust, which can overpower
the greatest and destroy civilizations as easily
as it does the intellects and wills of men.
There "is a type of isolation that is shown
by the capture of modern interest by the present
and the prurient, shown in illiteracy about not
simply history, but about the nobility and
courage of the past in the pilgrimage of man
from h is beginning toward his intended goal.
Television h as proved to be an instrument
of the trivial. Few of its offerings transcend
entertainment and diversion. A popular fad of
"reality TV" shows men and women embracing
a sort of barbarism and battling for survival. Of
course, it is staged and scripted. Even as fiction
it is prim itive compared to the literature of past
geniuses, which for the most part treated the
m oral and spiritual struggle of humans against
evil. Such writing today finds difficulty in getting
pu blished, and usually earns small, if any profit
for writers of publishing houses.
Part of "reality TV's" success is its
frankness abou t the formerly private aspect
of living. So, too, with the invasive cameras
that sh ow people carrying out "private" needs
involving various degrees of nudity. Th~re
certainly was earthiness to some-even muchthat Shakespeare wrote. Bu t never in its use
was the true dignity of man insulted; rather,
su ch dignity was enhanced by its contrast
with the cheap and vulgar. The good folk of
Shakespeare's art were always superior of
soul, n oble in will and ch oice, "genteel" in the
gen u ine meaning of that word, that is, having
virtues associated with a true superiority-selfrespect, deference, courage, fulfillment of duty.
Now, entertainment has become a display of
emotions, of animal capability, of instincts for
survival put to cunning u se.
Barbarians were once the unci.vilized,
ignorant of art and crude of language. The
Catholic Church was the main influence that
civilized the barbarians, "gentled" them into
gentility. That was fortunate for most of u s .
America was created by descendants of the
former barbarians. Their present descendantsthat is, ou r children, grandchildren, great-great
grandchild ren- are in grave danger of being decivilized, and again made barbarous. A major
help in this process has been America's divorce
not simply from any established Church, but
from religion itself. The idea has grown greatly,
starting in the 20th century, that almost all
values are superior to religious ones.
With that h as come the idea of selfsufficient Man. But the truly educated man,
he of wisdom and philosophy, of ethics and
honesty, recognizes above all his dependence
on a Superior Being from whom he received
immaterial gifts, the greatest being the capacity
to love unselfishly and generously.
Do not be surprised if th at aspect of
humanness, is discard ed under pressures to
consider Man self-sufficient. Do not be surprised
if a barbarian st ate of tyranny becomes again
admired, as it was when exercised by modern
and older despots. If today's coarseness has
reached our soul, we h ave a fatal condition.

(Mr. Morriss is Executive Editor of The
Wanderer, in which publication this article first
appeared). (Reprinted with permission).
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family, those who have a realistic potential
of having a family should be classified as
married, and those who have no potential .
should be domestic partners. Otherwise, a
state's failure to recognize same sex marriages
reeks of discrimination, justified by the
"moral" condemnation of homosexuality.
Unfortunately,
the
inability
of
Americans to separate church and state has·
allowed the traditional definition of"marriage"
to determine legal rights. Legal rights,
however, should rest on rational application,
not just tradition. The irony is that generally
all traditional religions don't recognize
gay marriage, but no traditional religion
recognizes heterosexual marriages outside
their · particular church. Accordingly, those
married outside of our own particular religion
should not be considered married. However,
somehow Americans manage to compromise
these traditional notions when forming laws
to promote a better society. As we have done
for hundreds of years, ·Americans must
again compromise tradition to preserve the
purpose of government intervention. If this
is an uncompromising area for Americans,
America is better off taking marriage, and
any connotation of it, out of our laws and
putting it back where it traditionally belongs
- our churches.
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of discrimination embodied in the Defense of
Marriage Movement.
Examination of some state incest laws
provide further evidence of states' failure
appropriately to define marriage in light of the
benefits conferred. In some states first blood
cousins can marry, in other states first cousins
are not permitted to marry, and in states such
"The Woolsack is indebted to Professor Robert
as Utah, Arizona and Indiana, first cousins are
Simmons, a candidate for the law school poet
permitted to marry if the couple is of a certain
laureate award, for his s ubmission of the verse
age (generally between fifty-five and sixtyprinted below. Professor Simmons reports that
five) or sterile or both. In Utah for example,
these selections were prepared in connection
state incentives provided through recognizing
with a trial techniques course."
marriage for cousins is strictly based on the
-February 1973.
determination that the couple cannot have
a natural family. Therefore, cousins, who
Jury Selection
undergo a vasectomy or are too old to conceive
An unctuous lawyer named Quick
children cannot be rationally distinguished
Began his voir dire very slick.
from a domestic partnership relationship. The
He smiled, syruped and fawned
probability of either group raising children
Till a male juror yawned
appears to be the same. Moreover, these blood
And allowed it was making him sick.
relationships, prohibited for their harmful
consequences, are accepted once those harmful
A loquacious young lawyer named Blabberskit,
consequences are eliminated. This brings back
Began his voir dire and just wouldn't quit.
into question the rationale of state marriage
When he finally forbore
benefits. Is the purpose of marital status benefits
The jurors all swore
to promote general stability in companionship,
That they now had a bias and shouldn't sit.
or to foster an environment to provide for the
nuclear family? If the former prevails, then
(Mr. Carlton is a second~year law student at
Opening Statement
same sex marriages should receive the same
USD).
A prattling lawyer named !'ranee
recognition as traditional · marriages. If the
Leaves nothing whatever to chance.
Madam Grammar,
latter prevails, then Utah's recognition of sterile
He spews facts and law
marriages contains no justifiable basis.
continued from page 15. With a piston-like jaw
The analysis of state incest laws leads
query made in good faith. Would you please Putting everyone into a trance.
to another significant and easily recognizable
explain the difference between a gerund and
class of citizens who should be classified as
a participle?
A p edantic young lawyer named Fission
domestic partners (or .b e denied the rights of
- Timid not Truculent
Reads each word of his five-page petition.
marital status) - elderly couples married after
DearTimid not Truculent,
He misses his aim
the age of sixty-fore. At a certain age, elderly
Gladly shall I accede. An English By burying his claim;
citizens become incapable of reproducing. As
gerund is formed by adding the suffix "ing" to But he's proud of his vast erudition.
suggested by incest laws, it is statistically
the root form of a verb. The gerund functions
inconceivable for a woman to reproduce at the
both as a verb and as a noqn. For example,
Plaintiff's Case
age of sixty-five. Hence, it is improbable that
the gerund of walk is walking, and may be A languorous lawyer named Short
the traditional marriage can come to fruition
used thus: "My walking after tea gives me Would.Q.'t dream of p·reparing for court.
(and even less likely through adoption). So
indigestion." Note that the gerund refers His questions at trial
why should states provide marital benefits
to the process of walking as an act and as All miss by a mile.
supposedly aimed at the promotion of . the
a thing. Now, a present participle is also He's in contract-the case is in tort.
traditional family? States cannot bestow
formed by a dding "ing" to the verb's root.
marital benefits on promoting companionship
Accordingly, the present participle of walk is An eloquent lawyer named Gruitec,l
between two people, for that would look eerily
walking, which is facially indistinguishable Is superb at summation, 'tis bruited .
similar to same sex relationships. If nature
from the gerund. The present participle It's a shame that he's lax
plays a part in the definition of an appropriate
differs from the gerund, however, in that At gathering facts,
marriage, as demonstrated by the inability of
the participle functions as a verb and as For his client is always non-suited.
homosexuals to reproduce, or the ill effects
an adjective. For example, "Walking to the
of incestuous relationships, then how can a
haberdasher's, I came across several old
Defendant's Case
state justify providing benefits to the elderly
school chums." Here the participle walking A belligerent lawyer named Bendix
or older incestuous companions, whom society
both identifies an act and describes the actor Bullies, brow-beats and plaintiff-pricks.
acknowledges to be incapable of conceiving
in the sentence's main clause (as part of a His passionate furors
children? But let's see the traditionalists
participial phrase).
Delight the insurers
convince the American Association of Retired
Till they learn the size of the verdicts.
Persons that the elderly who marry are just
Dear Madam Grammar,
domestic partners .
What is your opinion of British spelling A contract lawyer named Perry Fling
As long as Americans are so concerned
. appearing in American publications?
Will never admit to anything.
with protecting the sanctity of marriage, they
Aspiring Anglophile
In his fight over trifles
should also focus their efforts on preventing
Dear Aspiring Anglophile,
.He usually stifles
those who are not old enough to graduate
You raise a question of some concern and Any hope of his client in winning.
from high school, or haven't lived long enough
delicacy among grammarians on both sides
to die in a war, from joining in a "sacred
of the Pond. As you well know, spelling i.n the
Closing Arguments
union" - a union so important that society
English language did not become regularized A vehement lawyer named Benadeux
feels compelled not to appease a de minimis
to any degree of satisfaction until well into Declares to the jury what they must do.
number of same sex couples. Surely "sanctity
the nineteenth century. Prior to that time, His insistent demands
of marriage" partisans see the absurdity of
it would have been difficult to- say, "This is Are persuasive commands
the notion that young boys and girls can fully
the American (or colonial) spelling, but that To the client, his wife and Benedeux.
comprehend a lifelong commitment they are
is the English spelling," simply because n o
allowed to make before these same children
regional idiosyncrasies had yet emerged. But A forgetful lawyer named Fairly
are allowed to vote president, let alone drive a
nowadays certainly there are divergences: Never quotes the evidence squarely.
car. Ironically, California's laws appear to put
any of the Latin derivations ending in "or" for His errors so wide
more requirements on those acquiring dome.stic
_the Americans and "our" for the Brits; an "s" Always favor his side.
partnership status than those applying for a
to replace a "c" as in "defense" (American) and But the jury favors him rarely.
marriage license. Domestic partners must be
"defence" (British); a single "r' or double "lr' as
at least eighteen years of age, but heterosexual
in "willful" (American) and "wilful" (British).
couples need not be. Perhaps Californians think
Who has the better of it? I would say cease giving thanks to the Almighty for British
it is just a phase for youthful homosexuals, and _ for the mere sake of simplicity and brevity pronunciation). But then one can come right
they will grow out of it. Yet a similar state age
that the Americans generally have the better back with "fulfil" (British) and save a consonant
requirement for the traditional marriage (or
forms: they can write "labor" in six rather to the Americans' "fulfill." Perhaps we would
better yet a constitutional ·a mendment) seems
than seven letters and they take the word do well to cite the Anglo-American special
appropriate.
verbatim from Latin. They perhaps also score relationship and call it a tie. But as for your
In order to justify subsiding marriage
for phonetics:
their "civilization" sounds specific question, viz. the practice of British
to protect the traditional family, states must
closer to the spoken word than the British spellings popping up in American printed
do so on a consistent basis. As long as
"civilisation" (although anyone · who has matter, I think the practice to be lamentable.
distinguishing rights from homosexual unions
ever had the great good fortune of hearing The Americans have a beautiful if provincial
and heterosexual unions rests on the nuclear
Lord Clarke vocalize that word, will never dialect; they need not "put the dog on."
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POLICE ROADBLOCKS
AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

By Jonathan Meislin
Staff Writer

~

On January 13, 2004, in fllinois v.
Lindster, the United States Supreme Court
clarified a controversial point of law when it
held that brief police roadblocks for the purpose
of questioning motorists for informational
reasons do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
This decision comes after the Supreme Court
ruled in Indianapolis v. Edmond (531 U.S. 32
(2000)) that police roadblocks for the purpose
of finding evidence of drugs violate a motorist's
Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Stephen
Breyer, writing for the majority in Lindster,
distinguished police road stops for questioning
from police road stops used to search for
drugs by noting that when an officer stops
a motorist for questioning, the officer is not
trying to ascertain whether or not the motorist
has committed a crime, but rather whether the
motorist has any information that can assist
the police in apprehending other criminals.
Lindster concerned a drunken motorist
who was arrested after he was stopped at a
police roadblock. The roadblock was set up
to question motorists about a hit-and-run that
had occurred a week earlier in which a seventy
year-old bicyclist was killed. The police set up
the roadblock at the same location and time
of day as the hit-and-run. The police were
stopping motorists to ascertain if they had
any information about the hit-and-run, and to
hand out flyers with contact information. The
defendant Lindster pulled up to the roadblock,
nearly hit an officer, and immediately was
given a sobriety test due in part to the smell
of alcohol on his breath. At trial Lindster cited
Edmond and claimed that the road stop was an
unconstitutional invasion of his privacy. The
Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Lindster.
The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that informational road stops are not
a violation of a motorist's Fourth Amendment
rights.
Justice Breyer began his opinion for
the majority by distinguishing between the
purpose of stopping motqrists for questioning
and the purpose of stopping motorists under
the suspicion that any given motorist has
committed a crime, which latter practice was
held unconstitutional in Edmond. In that case
a search of an individual's car by an officer's
general inspection (which entailed the shining
of a flashlight into the "plain view" area of the
car and the use of a drug sniffing dog) was held
to be an intrusion into a motorist's right to
privacy. In Lindster Justice Breyer argued that
the stop in question was nothing more than an
inquisition for information, not a stop based
on generalized suspicion, and therefore not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Stops not
based on generalized suspicion, argued Breyer,
are less likely to be intrusive or to provoke
anxiety. These factors, in combination with the
fact that the stops are brief and are not intended
to elicit incriminating information, confirm the
Court's conclusion that the stops do not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
The opinion did not come without some
criticism. Justice John Paul Stevens, in his
partial concurring opinion, wrote, "There is
a valid and important distinction between
seizing a person to determine whether she
has committed a crime and seizing a person
to ask whether she has any information about
an unknown person who committed a crime
a week earlier." Justice Stevens , ·along with
two other justices, were of the opinion that the
facts did not show whether the road block was
tailored enough to the specific task at hand.
Stevens cautioned that the determination of
whether alternative and less obtrusive methods
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are available is a question for the trial court,
and that the proper procedure would be to
remand the case to the state courts for further
inquiry. For if police are able to have free reign
to set up roadblocks any time there is a "need"
for information, motorists may become trapped
in unconstitutional situations.

"investment" for capital gain purposes, stated
the Court, because the Internal Revenue Code
deems all gambling winnings to be ordinary
income. (I.RC.§ 165(d)). Since Plaintiff by state
law was able legally to alien his lottery interest
only after he had won the lottery, and because
Plaintiff had made no capital investment before
winning the lottery, his right to the lottery
proceeds could not be characterized as capital
gain.
Additionally the Court concluded that,
because Plaintiff incurred no cost to receive the
right to alien his lottery annuity payments, the
value paid by Woodbridge to Plaintiff could not
be considered capital appreciation. Although
By Damien Schiff
Plaintiff received value, it did not compensate
Editor
Plaintiff for an increase in value over cost for
the annuity "asset." Rather, the $4 million was
In a case of first impression, a panel of intended to be the rough equivalent of what
·the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether Plaintiff earned by gambling on the Oregon
the right to annuity payments derived from state lottery in 1991 . The reward for that labor - the
lottery winnings, when transferred for valuable lottery funds - was ordinary income, and its
consideration to a third party, is entitled to conversion to an alienable annuity did not
treatment as capital gain under the Internal change its classification for tax purposes.
Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. (I.RC.)§ 1222).
As an aside, the Court also noted that
Plaintiff and spouse, an Oregon couple, its approval of Plaintiffs characterization would
won a $9 million jackpot in the state lottery create a "dichotomous system" in which lottery
in 1991. Plaintiff elected to take the winnings winners who elected to take their winnings as
in annual installments of $450,000. In 1995 an annuity would receive favored tax treatment
th'e Oregon state legislature authorized lottery over those winners who would take their
annuitants to alien their lottery annuity. The winnings as a lump sum.
following year Plaintiff transferred to Woodbridge
Plaintiff, anticipating a brutal assault
Financial Corporation his right to the remaining with the "substitute for ordinary income"
fifteen annuity payments in exchange for nearly doctrine, tried to parry with three arguments.
$4 million.
(1) The doctrine had been tacitly overruled
On his 1996 tax return Plaintiff by the Supreme Court. (2) The doctrine is
reco.r ded the $4 million as ordinary income. In inapplicable where the taxpayer retains no
1998 Plaintiff petitioned the IRS for a partial interest in the capital asset. (2) The lottery right
refund of his 1996 taxes, arguing that the $4 is a debt instrument under I.RC. § 1275.
Answering Plaintiffs first argument, the
million received in exchange for his annuity
right should have been characterized as capital Court distinguished the "offending" precedent,
gain and therefore taxed at a lower rate. The Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm'r, construing that
IRS agreed and refunded with interest some case as concerning only the "business motive"
$300,000. But in March 2001 the IRS sued element of the capital asset definition and not
Plaintiff for the refunded taxes, argui:p.g that the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine.
the $4 million should have been classified as Addressing Plaintiffs second point, the Court
ordinary income not capital gain.
refused to hold the doctrine inapplicable to
On summary judgment the district all transactions where the taxpayer no longer
court for the District of Oregon found for the retains any interest in the capital asset. Instead
government, concluding that "capital gains the Court found that Plaintiffs transfer of his
treatment is not appropriate here because no entire lottery ·right was not sufficient in itself to
asset appreciated." Plaintiff appealed to the exempt the transaction from the doctrine. And
Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. as for Plaintiffs argument that the lottery right
In an opinion written by Judge Raymond was a debt instrument, the Court concluded
Fisher, the Court noted that it was the first that Plaintiffs lottery right was based upon
to address the issue whether "the sale of a the state's gift not the "use or forbearance of
lottery right is a long-term capital gain." The money."
Court highlighted the balancing task before
The Court did not address the
it: ensuring on the one hand that taxpayers government's contention that, even if the
can avoid the unfairness of being taxed all at $4 million had been classifiable as capital
once for the multi-year appreciation of a capital gain, Plaintiff would have been judicially
asset, and preventing shrewd but unscrupulous estopped from so alleging, because he had
taxpayers from craftily classifying all their argued the opposite position in state court tax
income as the transfer of rights to a future proceedings.
stream of income.
The case is United States v. Maginnis,
To make that balancing task easier, the No. 02-35664 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2004).
Supreme Court has established the "substitute
for ordinary income" doctrine. That doctrine
requires that the courts narrowly construe
"capital asset" to preclude taxpayers from
converting ordinary income into pseudo-capital
gains. Any lump sum received in lieu of what
would be received in the future as ordinary By Damien Schiff
income is treated as ordinary income. Owing Editor
to the absence of Congressional guidance, the
A United States District Court has ruled
doctrine operates on a case-by-case basis.
that part of the USA Patriot Act is unenforceable
Applying the "substitute for ordinary because unconstitutionally vague.
In an
income" principle to the Plaintiffs lottery opinion dated January 22, Judge Audrey B.
transfer, the Court had no difficulty in finding Collins of the Central District of California in
the $4 million to be ordinary income, for two Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft [HLP)
main reasons. One, Plaintiff "did not make any enjoined the federal government from enforcing
underlying investment of capital in return for against the named Plaintiffs section 805(a)(2)(B)
the receipt of his lottery right." Two, the "sale of the Patriot Act, which provision ostensibly
of his right did not reflect an accretion in value proscribes the lending of "expert advice or
over cost to any underlying asset" that Plaintiff assistance" to designated foreign terrorist
held.
organizations.
Plaintiffs purchase of the winning
lottery ticket cannot itself be considered an Please see Patriot Act at page 13

CAN LOTTERY WINNINGS
EVER BE CAPITAL GAINS?
UNLIKELY, SAYS NINTH
CIRCUIT

PORTIONS OF
PATRIOT ACT HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
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Patriot Act, from page 12
· The HLP Plaintiffs were connected in
varying degrees with the Partiya Karkeran
Kurdistan (PKK), a political organization that
seeks self-determination for Kurds in Turkey,
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), a political organization that seeks selfdetermination for the Tamils of Sri Lanka. In
1997 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
pursuant to authority granted by the AntiTerrotj.sm and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), designated the PKK and LTTE as
"foreign terrorist organizations."
In a prior case, Plaintiffs obtained an
injunction against the enforcement of section
805(a)(2)(B)'s s tatutory predecessor, found
in AEDPA.
That version prohibited giving
"training" and "personnel" to foreign terrorist
organizations. Judge Collins granted Plaintiffs'
injunction in the first suit, holding that the
AEDPA provision was unconstitutionally vague.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed that
decision. Accordingly, Plaintiffs brought the
instant action to contest the Patriot Act's
addition of "expert advice or assistance" to the
old AEDPA provision.
Plaintiffs principally argued that the
s tatutory phrase "expert advice or assistance"
was impermissibly vague and thus violated
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clau se.
Plaintiffs also argued that the statute could
be construed to trench upon First Amendment
liberties, such as speech, petition and
association.
Responding to these contentions, the HLP
court began its analysis by noting three reasons
why a statute might be unconstitutionally
vague.
(1) A statute would be void for
vagueness if a reasonably intelligent person
could not anticipate whicfu. activities the statute
prohibited. (2) A statute might also violate the
con s titutional vagueness rule if it permitted
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcem en t. (3)
Lastly, a statute that created a chilling effect on
the exercise of First Amendment liberties would
be constitutionally infirm. And as for criminal
statutes generally, a court would b e compelled
to overturn -a law that failed to give fair notice
t h at particular conduct was sanctionable.
Plaintiffs argued that the words "expert,"
"advice" and "assistance" as used in the Patriot
Act fail to identify the type of conduct prohibited,
and are indistinguishable in m eaning from the
words "training" and "personnel," which Judge
Collins h ad previously h eld to b e impermissibly
vague.
The governm ent conceded that section
805(a)(2)(B) does not prohibit advocacy on
behalf of terrorist groups, nor does it sanction
association with those groups for advocacy
purposes. But the statute gives "fair warning"
that any expert advice or assistance to t errorist
organizations is forbidden, including medical
and economic development assistance, as well
as human rights advocacy activities.
In ruling for Plaintiffs, the court stressed
the close relation between AEDPA's "training"
and "p ersonnel" and the Patriot Act's "expert
a dvice or assistance." The latter phrase can
easily be construed to encompass activities
covered by "training" or "personnel." Given
that these terms h ave already been h eld to be
irnpermissibly vague, it follows, argued Judge
Collins, that their synonym - "expert a dvice or
assistance" - is also impermissibly vague.
Notwithstanding
the
government's
concession that section 805(a)(2)(B) d oes n ot
impinge upon First Amendment liberties, its
admission that any and all "expert advice
or assistance" is p roscribed would, the
court declared, lead n ecessarily to som e
con s titutionally protected activity (su ch as
petitioning the United Nations on behalf of
the terroris t organizations) falling within
the section's scope. Accordingly, the court
concluded that section 805(a)(2)(B)'s vagueness
deprived Plaintiffs of liberty without due process
of law.
Curiou sly, although the court considered
section 805(a)(2)(B)'s possible application to
First Amendment-protected activity to be an
important factor leading to its conclusion that
the provision is unconstitutionally vague, the
court nevertheless denied Plaintiffs' overbreadth
challen ge.
Plaintiffs h a d argued that the
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PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CAREERS
IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

By Mary Moreno
The panelists' comments were frank, realistic
Special to Motions
and far-ranging, worthy of the attention of
The 19th Annual Southern California anyone interested in a legal career, let alone a
Public Interest Law Career Day sponsored by public interest law career.
the various Southern California law schools,
The panelists were: Mike Evans, a fourincluding USD, was recently held at UCLA. year associate with Brancart & Brancart, a civil
Many regional, state and federal organizations rights law firm with a concentration on fair
had tables with brochures and resume-drop housing and lending issues; Ines Kuperschmidt,
trays. 2Ls and 3Ls who had previously pre- a Skadden Fellow at the Public Counsel Law
registered and submitted resumes were able to Center; Karin Wang, Vice President of Programs
interview with interested agencies for summer at the Asian Pacific American Legal Center;
and full-time employment.
Andre Binotte, Jr., Inspector General, Los
One of the more edifying events was the Angeles Police Commission; and Bert Voorhees,
morning Panel Discussion. The discussion was a partner of Traber & Voorhees, a private public
moderated by Associate Dean R. Scott Wylie interest law firm specializing in employment
(Whittier Law School), with participants ranging discrimination, fair housing, and similar
from a mid-level associate in a civil rights issues.
law firm and the Inspector General of the Los
First, Dean Wylie asked the panelists
Angeles Police Commission to a Skadden Fellow if any had intended public interest as a career
at the nonprofit Public Counsel Law Center. ·while in law school. All responded in the
affirmative.
"expert advice or assistance" provision prohibits
Next discussed was the best way while
a substantial amount of protected speech. The in law school to build a resume attractive to
government countered that Plaintiffs offered no public interest law employers. In other words,
examples of ~core political activities" prohibited what do employers look for? The main "must
by section 805(a)(2)(B).
have" is proof of your choice of public interest
In holding for the government, the court as a career. Each panelist had been actively
stated that the "Patriot Act's prohibition of the involved while in law school in public interest
provision of 'expert advice or assistance' is activities on campus or in the community or
aimed at furthering a legitimate state interest: both. This held true in the nonprofit and forcurbing support for designated foreign terrorist profit arenas. Bert Voorhees emphasized that
organizations' activities, which unquestionably for-profit law firms like his also look for work
constitute 'harmful, constitutionallyunprotected experience in a ddition to commitment to social
conduct."' Thus the court concluded that as- change, or some evidence both of passion and
applied challenges to the "expert advice or production/ critical thinking.
assistance" provision would be sufficient to
An area of huge concern to 2Ls and 3Ls
safeguard First Amendment liberties.
is the present batriers to getting a job in the
The court also disagreed with Plaintiffs' public interest law field. Mr. Evans' comment
contention that section 805(a)(2)(B) criminalizes brought down the house: "The biggest barrier
protected associational activity, and that the to getting a job is that we are not hiring." It was
Secretary of State's authority to designate recognized by all that there is a lack of jobs as
organizations as terrorist is impermissibly well as a lack of affordability in terms of pay
broad. The court instead held that Plaintiffs' scale.
"associational" challenge had been ruled upon
Andre Binotte Jr. (Insp ector General of
in earlier litigation, . and that theJ.Secretary's L.A. Police Commission) b elieves that "civilian
authority to designate terrorist organizations oversight of law enforcement is a growing
was not tantamount to "unfettered discretion."
field by regional development." The Inspector
HLP
also
·presented
significant General's Office reviews police misconduct
justiciability issues of standing and ripeness. reports, all "shooting'' cases (anytime a police
The government strongly argued that Plaintiffs weapon is discharged on the job), and conducts
had no history of prosecution under the operation audits. Mr. Binotte was appointed in
"expert advice or assistance" provision and May 2003, and he finds that the office is still
that they had failed to articulate any concrete evolving in terms of responsibilities and scale.
plan for violating the provision in the future.
Ms. Kuperschmidt mentioned that
Additionally, the government contended that fellowships are one way through the barrier,
the activities Plaintiffs intended to commit although it is very competitive; students must
were not arguably "expert." Consequently, the think ahead and begin to prepare by their
government claimed that Plaintiffs' case did not second year of law school. Another way to jump
present an Article III case or controver sy.
the barrier is to commit to a meaningful amount
Plaintiffs parried arguing that their of time in the public interest field while a law
mere fear of prosecu tion was sufficient to studen t via internships and externships.
overcome any standing obstacles in light of the
All the p anelists agreed that candidates
less rigid justiciability requirements applied with language skills truly stand out. While
in First Amendment cases. Plaintiffs pointed almost any language is useful, of cou rse in the
to the government's vigorous enforcement of Southern California area fluency in the Spanish
the material support provision of AEDPA (as language is most prized by employers , followed
amended by the Patriot Act) since the September closely by Pacific Rim and Asian languages.
11 attacks. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' intend ed Ms. Kuper schmidt emphasized that many law
medical and humanitarian activities, su ch as schools permit transfer of a limited number of
making presentations to the UN and providing credits for non-law school courses, and that
medical expertise, were clearly "expert" within this may be a way for students to obtain or
the meaning of section 805(a)(2)(B).
polish language skills.
The court found no justiciability
She also encouraged students to
obstacle. It considered Plaintiffs' plans to be maximize the u se of law school credits in
more than hypothesis and therefore sufficient the form of clinics, practicums, internships,
to overcome the governm ent's ju sticiability externships and clerkships to gain real
objections. Although the threat of prosecution work experience.
A Skadden Fellow, Ms.
may not be exceptionally high, in the First Kuperschmidt stated, "You can pass the Bar
Amendment context the courts have adopted a without taking Bar classes in law school"
"hold your tongue and challenge now'' approach providing you take a solid bar review course and
to permit adjudication of First Amendment are the type of student who performs well under
cases.
The court considered Plaintiffs' cramming-type conditions. She cautioned that
peacemakin g and human rights a dvocacy to be this path was not for everyone-some students
arguably "expert" enough to fall within section will perform better on the Bar having taken
8 0 5 (a)(2)(B)'s scope. But the court dismissed Bar courses in law school- and that ·students
two Plaintiff organizations becaus·e they failed should know themselves and be confident in
to describe their activities sharply enough to their study habits and abilities before taking
permit the court to determine whether they this route.
were sufficiently expert.
In terms of making the most of
Thus the court granted Plaintiffs'
Public Interest,
injunction precluding enforcement of section
8 05 (a )(2)(B) a gainst the named Plaintiffs only .
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_ON BEING A
GOOD LAWYER

,.,......

-

By James V. Schall, s. J.
Professor of Government
Georgetown University
Special to Motions
"But while Gallio was · Proconsul of
Achaia, certain Jews made a concerted attack
on Paul and brought him before the Tribunal.
'We accuse this man,' they said, 'of persuading
people to worship God in a way that breaks the
Law.' Before Paul could open his mouth, Gallio
said to the Jews present, 'Listen, if this were a
misdemeanor or a crime, I would not hesitate
to attend to you; but if it is only quibbles about
words and names and about your own Law,
then you must deal with it yourselves -- I have
no intention of making legal decision about
things like that." These words, of course, are
taken from the eighteenth chapter of the Acts
of the Apostles. They serve to remind us of
the fact that St. Paul was not slow to use legal
means available to him when it was necessary
to protect himself and his mission from unjust
treatment.
To be a good lawyer, however, is it
enough to be merely a "good" lawyer? To be a
good lawyer, is it enough to be a "good man?"
To be a good lawyer, is it helpful or advisable
or even necessary also to be a good Christian, a
good Catholic? Is it legal or politic to ask such
questions , even in a church in a free society?
Dare we even hint at such a correlation? Is
law like mathematics in which there can be no~
specifically "Christian" approach'?
The story is told of the famous lawyer
Rufus Choate, an associate of Daniel Webster,
about a case involving a Boston shipping
house. On the witness stand was a crusty Irish
shipowner. Choate was trying to confuse the
Irishman by asking him a long and involved
technical question. According to a spectator
at the trial, Choate's questioning bobbed all
around the case and straggled through every
street in Boston. But the witness remained
calm and unflappable through it all. When
Mr. Choate at some length had finished , the
Irishman leaned forward and, in a voice clearly
heard throughout the court, asked him, "Mr.
Choate, will ye be afther repating that question
again?"
So let me, following a famous pedagogical
principle about the mother of studies, repeat
once more my initial questions: To be a good
lawyer, is it enough to be a "good" lawyer? To be
a good lawyer, is it enough to be a "good human
being"? To be a good lawyer, is it h elpful or
advisable or even necessary also to be a good
Jew, a good Christian, a good Catholic?
If goon lawyers can do a great deal of
good, must it not in logic follow that b ad lawyer s
can do a great deal of harm? Following Plato,
lawyers, like doctors, can be "ba d" lawyers in
two senses: a) they do not know the law, orb)
they do know the law but skillfully u se it for a
wrong purpose. And can the evolving system
under which lawyers become lawyers in the
first place, the constitutional system itself,
make it more difficult to be a good lawyer, and
hence a good human being, particularly when
our philosophers, unlike Socrates, too often
teach that good and bad do not constitute a real
distinction?
Political
philosophers are
asking
this question about the integrity of what, in
practice, is passing for the Constitution today.
Not a few h ave the distinct impression that our
constitutional system no longer has a stable
grounding in something other than itself, in
something other than pure will of lawyers,
judges, or people. This very point -- the
notion of a constitution grounded only in will
-- is the most disturbing problem about modern
democracies
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But, we might ask ourselves, does not
·t he world love lawyers? Is not law a growth
industry? In a New Yorker cartoon, we are in
a well-appointed Manhattan living room. We
see three persons, two ladies and a broadly
smiling, self-satisfied, portly gentleman. The
second lady, evidently a newly arrived guest,
stands, arms folded, with a most puzzled look
on her face. The other lady, obviously the wife
of the gentleman, is quite buoyant. Her arm
is on her husband's shoulder. She is pointing
at his ample mid-rift, saying proudly, "Edna,
this is Frank, my happiness, solace, delight,
inspiration, comfort, joy, and lawyer." Some
wives still love their lawyer husbands.
But does the world love lawyers? Most
liberal arts universities today, it seems, are
filled with undergraduates preparing for law
school. I cannot even begin to count the vast
number of law school recommendations I have
Written for good students over the years. I
sometimes wonder, so much has our lives
becon:ie politicized, if beq>ming a lawyer ought
not to be a natural right, something to be issued
with our birth certificate ..
On every side, no doubt, we hear
complaints and worries about the overlegalization or over-politicization of society. We
suspect that so many laws are not leading to
more virtue but to an exclusive identification
of morality with positive law. Not a few critics
directly relate the economic decline or prosperity
of a nation to the relative burden of the law on
an economy.
On this topic, I take a bemused delight,
I must confess, while we are reading Plato in
class, to pause at the passage in The Republic, in
which Plato points out that a society filled with
students of medicine and law is already a sick
society. On hearing this, the s tudents laugh
half-heartedly, vaguely wondering whether Plato
was ever wrong. Plato meant, of course, that
lack of self-discipline or lack of virtue caused
many of the medical problems and most of the
legal and criminal ones in any society. Plato's
passage still gives us pause even after twentyfive hundred years; though, I suppose, from a
self-interested point of view, lawyers could apply
to themselves de Mandeville's famous remark in
The Fable of the Bees about economics, that it
prospered handsomely when vices were most
flourishing.
The New Testament, it c;:m be easily
noticed, is surprisingly filled with many legal
incidents and precedents. No study of law is
complete without a detailed look at this record.
The trial of Jesus before the Roman governor
Pilate is an obvious instance. We cannot ponder
John's account of this trial often enough.
Certain chapters near the end of the
Acts of the Apostles can be considered. Before
the law, Paul was fighting to prevent his being
killed by local para-legal bands out to eliminate
him. He skillfully presented himself before the
Roman law courts, before Felix, Festus, and
Agrippa.
It is sometimes overlooked how shrewdly
St. Paul used his Roman citizenship, even
though he was a Jew, a Pharisee in fact. These
passages in St. Paul alone are enough to make
us realize that the New Testament itself, though
it pioneered the notion that some things do ·not
belong to Caesar, did not intend to supplant or
overlook the civil society in which it appeared.
The sword was given for our punishment, Paul
taught in Romans. Indeed, Paul recognized
that Roman civil law, the famous Codex Juris
Civilis, as it came to be entitled when later set
down under Justinian, the remote origin of
all modem legal systems, gave him a certain
welcome freedom and protection to pursue his
own mission which required him to go over from
Asia into Macedonia and on to Rome.
Thus even though Christians were
advised to settle disputes among themselves by
their own institutions and r eligious principles ,
there were times, with St. Paul, when they
h ad to resort to the Roman courts. When we
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understand this fact, we still should not forget
the result of the trial of Jesus or the fate of
Paul. We should not forget, in the end, the
sorry record of the lawyers and the judge in this
most poignant forensic scene of life and death
before the legally appointed Roman judge and
politician, whose authority Christ himself said
would not have existed if it did not come from
God.
Do I have any concrete advice for lawyers
who are Catholic? Indeed, I do. The first thing
that they have to do, and this will take time
-and effort, as serious a study as anything ever
studied in law school, is to learn precisely
what the Catholic Church teaches about itself.
If I were but to list the misconceptions and
downright lies that appear about the Church
almost daily in our media and even in our
scholarly journals, it would, I fear, take me
considerable time.
The Church, without denying its own
faults, needs far more effective legal mechanisms
than we now have to call careful attention to
and, yes, at times even to prosecute and sue,
certain false and slanderous statements about
the Catholic Church. This latter effort is surely
a task of Catholic lawyers, both individually and
corporately. We now begin to get public figures
and appointees who are, by any standard,
prejudiced and biased against Catholicism as
such.
We almost daily have charged to us with
impunity what analogously, were it to be said
of Jews or blacks or Muslims, would cause the
roof to cave in. It is a. commonplace that we
Catholics are almost the only group that can be
attacked with no legal or political consequences.
We do not forget about turning the other cheek.
But we also do recall about the light shining
before men. We do not forget that the truth,
including the truth about ourselves, "the whole
truth about man," as John Paul II often puts
it, is to be clearly and accurately stated. We
have a right and duty to do so, as Peter and
John already had taught us in The Acts of the
Apostles.
In any case, my second suggestion is
to read . most carefully the General Catechism.
I think it is the most complete and finest
statement of th~ contents of the faith ever
written. It is thorough, clear, to the point. No
lawyer 's book shelves should b e without it.
And it is what the Church teaches about the
essential things that really matter. These are
not primarily lawyer things, of course, though
some are. But they are all human things and
no one can afford to neglect a careful and
faithful reading of this remarkable document.
We all h ave time for it. We must make time for
it. We have on the Throne of Peter the most
remarkable of popes perhaps ever. He said
explicitly that this document is m eant for the
intelligent layman. If even the most average
lawyer is not that, he should not be in the legal
profession.
And at least some lawyers also should
pay attention to the study of the new Code of
Canon Law and the Church law itself. They
will be astonished to learn how much of the
content and practice of modern government
derives from canon law. If someone is in any
doubt, I suggest a reading Professor Harold J.
Berman's magisterial Law and Revolution: The
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.
Christof Cardinal von Schonborn, the
secretary of the commission for drafting the
General Catechism, remarked that the General
Catechism is written from the point of view
of the contents of the faith, that is, what is
said about God, about the sacraments, about
the commandments, and a bout how we pray.
This is what is handed down to us, what has
been pondered, defined, and reflected on
over the centuries by councils, popes, saints,
theologians, philosophers, and, yes, lawyers.
We should be astonished that we
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Good Lawyer,
continued from page 10

ever allowed ourselves not to know the truth
about these things as the Church has taught
them. So lawyers, like priests, and everyone
else, need to acquaint themselves with the
intellectual and legal side of the faith. It is
a much more fascinating enterprise than we
might initially expect. We live in a world in
which the coherent, profound, consistent side
of our religion is not even known or suspected,
often not even by ourselves. It is time to put a
stop to this, beginning with ourselves, both as
individuals and as organized groups.
Catholic lawyers, to conclude, can learn
much by reflecting on this account from the
twenty-third chapter of The Acts of the Apostles.
It seems that about forty young militant Jews
of the area had made a vow not to eat or drink
until they h ad killed Paul. Paul's nephew got
wind of this proposed ambush and told Paul.
Paul called a centurion and asked him to take
the young man to the tribune. The tribune
listened to news of the plot. Immediately he
called two centurions and two hundred troops,
plus seventy cavalry, to escort Paul by night to
Cesarea.
With the centurions the tribune sent the
following letter to Felix, the Roman governor.
This is how the letter read:
Claudius Lysias to his excellency
the governor Felix, greetings.
This man has been seized by
(certain) Jews and would have
been murdered ·by them but
I came on the scene with my
troops and got him away, having
discovered that he was a Roman
citizen. Wanting to find out what
charge they were making against
him, I brought him before their
Sanhedrin . I found that the
accusation concerned disputed
points in their Law, but that
there was no charge deserving
of death or imprisonment. My
information is that there is a
conspiracy against the man,
so I hasten to send him to you,
and have notified his accusers
that they must state their case
against him in your presence.
This letter is delivered to Felix who read the
letter. Felix asked Paul what province he was
from. Paul said Cilicia. Felix said that he would
hear his case when the accusers arrived. He
put Paul in protective custody overnight.
As we know, this same Paul had appealed
to Rome, was sent there, and eventually
perished there, the exact circumstances of his
death we do not know. Paul would not have
us say that this conclusion to his own life
prevents us from using the law when we can
also use it to uphold the Justice that belongs
to us to teach and practice the truth. We are,
finally, often told that our era is very different
from that of Paul and Felix. In a time when
we are rather vividly aware of scandals in the
Church that embarrass us all, even as we are
reminded about inner status of those who are
to cast the first stone, I leave the subject of good
lawyers with this one thought -- is our time so
different?
With the Irish ship-master, in conclusion,
let me recall and repeat the beginning passage
of these reflections from Acts of the Apostles:
But while Gallio was proconsul of
Achaia, certain Jews made a concerted
attack on Paul and brought him before
the tribunal. "We accuse this man," they
said, "of p ersuading people to worship
God in a way that breaks the Law."
Before Paul could open his mouth,
Gallio said to the Jews present, "Listen,
if this were a misdemeanor or a crime,
I would not hesitate to attend to you;
but if it is only quibbles about words
and names, and about your own Law,
then you must deal with it yourselves
-- I have no intention of making legal
decisions about things like 'that."
On reading such a passage today, it is difficult
not to admire the stern wisdom of the Roman
legal mind in seeking to moderate public
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frictions while not denying that they needed
to be resolved in their own order. We cannot
but admire the tribune who sent Paul to higher
authorities, to Gallio, the proconsul, who had
"no intention of making legal decisions about
things like that."

COLI, from page 1

could insure only key executives, whose
untimely deaths might cause real problems for
the company.
But a loosening of state rules in the
1980s allowed for an explosion in a new kind
of COLI that covers rank-and-file workers,
known in the insurance industry as "janitors
insurance" or "dead peasants" insurance.
Nowadays broad-based COLI plans typically
continue to insure workers even after they have
quit the company or retired, making it difficult
for some to see how the company would suffer a
loss if these individuals were fo die.
The practice is as widespread as it
is little-known. Research by the Wall Street
Journal found that numerous corporations
purchase COLI policies on millions oflower-level
employees, typically without their knowledge.
The business of selling COLI policies is thriving,
with premiums growing from $1.5 billion in
2000 to $2.8 billion in 2001. Among the U.S.
corporations that have bought such insurance
are AT&T, Dow Chemical, Nestle USA, Procter &
Gamble, Disney and Pitney Bowes.
Insurance executives maintain that
such policies are perfectly legal. In fact, Herb
Perone of the American Council of Life Insurers
argues, "Nobody gets upset when a company
insures its plant or its fleet of cars or land or
any other business asset. To think that your
labor force is not a business asset is extremely
s hortsighted."
The appeal of this newer kind of COLI
is driven by the generous tax benefits allowed
life insurance generally. Corporations gain not
merely from the tax-free life insurance benefits
they receive when current or former employees
die; corporations also can borrow money against
these policies. Corporations are not taxed on
gains from a life insurance policy; thus, COLI
policies in effect amount to tax-free investments
for businesses.
Currently, federal tax law prohibits the
use of life insurance as a tax shelter if there
isn't a legitim ate business purpose for having
it. From the start, many companies have
asserted that they use COLI to help finance
looming costs for retirees' benefits. While the
IRS can find out about COLI policies directly
from the companies, disclosure requirements
aren't tight. Employers do, in fact, u se other
kinds of COLI to pay for lavish retirement
benefits for executives. But disclosure rules
don't require them to distinguish between this
COLI earmarked for executive benefits and dead
peasants/ janitors COLI.
To top it all off, after the September
11 attacks oil the United States, some of the
first life insurance payouts went not to the
victims' families but to employers. Many of
the details surrounding the payouts have not
been publicized. But Hartford Life Insurance
Company's quarterly regulatory filing referen ced
an after-tax charge of $2 million related to the
September 11 attacks. Hartford itself has
confirmed this.
Many states have quickly moved to put
restrictions on the use of such policies. Most
have "advise and consent" laws that technically
require companies to get workers' permission
before buying life insurance on them. Even
then , however, companies may choose to offer a
small $1,000 or $5,000 benefit for the employee,
without telling them that the insurance benefit
the company will receive will be much larger.
And, if the particular state allows negative
consent, an employee could be insured unless
they act within a certain period of time to reject
the coverage.
The California Labor Federation last
year successfully lobbied politicians in the
state's capital to ban the corporate practice
of insuring the lives of rank-and-file workers.
That means that any employer that currently
holds any corporate life insurance police that
is prohibited under AB 226 must disclose it to
the subject employee(s) in writing by March 31,
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2004. Policies that are already in effect which
violate AB 226 will become void on the next
premium payment due date that is on or after
January 1, 2009, but no later than January 1,
2010.

Public Interest,
continued from page 13
opportunities, the panelists agreed that "focus"
and "hustle" are very important. They also
suggested narrowing in on a general sense of
where you want to go: client work, public policy,
impact litigation, etc. For example, Karin Wang
of the Asian Pacific American Legal Center
stated that her agency has a comprehensive
social change approach. When first out of
law school, Ms. Wang worked in litigation for
a big law firm while staying involved in the
community public interest issues ~he favors.
After a few years, s he realized she was more
interested in working for social change. With
her work experience, and more importantly the
credibility of her commitment to public interest,
she found her way to the Asian Pacific American
Legal Center.
Networking was mentioned, but it
was recommended particularly in the public
interest field that student interest be sincere
and credible. If your background is in public
policy, it is unlikely in today's climate that a
public interest agency focused on client work
will consider your resume. All the panelists
encouraged students to make the most of their
law school Career Services Office and public
interest centers while in law school.
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ASK MADAM
GRAMMAR

Dear Madam Grammar,

My husband and I have an ongoing (but
friendly) disagreement about the proper use of
the verbs "bring'' and "take." I think they can
be used interchangeably; he says "take" is only
used when transporting an object away from
its current position, and "bring" is used when
returning an object to its original place (as in
"bring it back''). If that is the case, how do you
explain "BYOB"?

I

l

- A Friend

Dear A Friend,

As the Supreme Court sometimes
refuses to decide on the merits cases deemed to
be too contentious, by terming them "political
questions," so perhaps also should Madam
Grammar decline to comment upon interspousal
debates, in the interests of domestic tranquility.
A happy medium may be found, however, in
the issuance of a "gramm ar advisory opinion,"
which shall not be binding upon the disputing
spouses but nonetheless may have some effect
upon subsequent usage. Having reviewed the
matter thoroughly, it is Madam Grammar's
position that your husband has it right. The
very first definition of to bring is to describe
the transporting of a thing to the place from
which the thing is regarded. In my dictionary,
the meaning of to take in the analogous sense
is accorded definition number fifteen, and
even then the end-point of the transporting is
presumed to be a place distinct from the point
from which the thing is regarded. Now, given
that we speak here of grammar, one would be
hard-pressed to defend this position against
every possible exception either in theory or
in practice; for only a small number of rules,
.generally ascribed to the natural law, can admit
of no exceptions. And as much as Madam
Grammar would like to have it otherwise, the
rules of grammar are not widely considered to
be of the natural law. Thus "BYOB" can be
admitted as an exception to the rule established
above.
Dear Madam Grammar,

I hope you will forgive what may appear
to be an overly fastidious question, but if I have
learned anything from being an avid reader
of yours, it is that you of all people are least
likely to . refuse to answer a grammar-related

Please see Madam Grammar
atpage 11
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SUPHEMf.
BAR REVIEW

California DVD Video Home Studv
Bar Review program
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Why pay more to watch videotaped lectures in a crowded classroom on someone else's schedule?
Save money with the only course that puts you in control of your bar preparatio n.
We are the only full-service bar review program in California to feature the
na~ion's best lecturers o n your own personal DVD videos.

Our program includes:

V DVD video lectures by experienced faculty
who are experts in their subject areas.

V Comprehensive outlines for every subject.
V Free DVD workshops for Essay, Performance Test, MBE.
V Six practice essays that are individually critiqued

PiJJ

FREE PU Multistate Bar Review course
($295 value), eliminating the need to pay
extra for supplemental MBE workshops.

FREE bonus Strategies & Tactics
for the MBE workbook.

by our experienced grad ing staff.
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V Free course guarantee .

Free MPRE DVD video and written materials available upon request ($I 0 shipping fee).
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For more information, to enroll, or to become
a campus representative, call toll-free
866-BAR-PREP or visit our website at:

www.SupremeBarReview.com

Enroll now and receive a free portable DVD player

upon payment of your $200 enrollment deposit ($15 shipping fee; model may vary).

